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Executive Summary 
An Analysis of Whole Farm Revenue Safety Net Options in Agriculture 
 
 
  Despite many years of experience, the federal government continues to seek a farm program 
that holds the potential for providing a politically acceptable safety net for farmers.  This study 
demonstrates that, with the 2002 Farm Bill, AMTA, and marketing loan provisions continuing, a 
whole farm revenue safety net has the potential for simplifying existing farm programs, while 
enhancing the financial position of US farmers.  There remains the need for further analysis of 
the impacts of the options analyzed on supply response by farmers. 
 
  The study compared the performance of three revenue options with current CAT, MPCI, 
and no insurance options.  Due to the problems of establishing actuarially sound rates in the 
absence of actual experience with the revenue options analyzed, it was assumed that the 
government provided all of the six options with a 100 percent subsidy.  The three whole farm 
revenue options included: 
 
•  Total farm revenue as reported on the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) income tax 
schedule for farmers (Schedule F/Form 4835), hereinafter referred to as the Schedule 
F option. 
•  Total farm revenue as reported on the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) income tax 
schedule for farmers (Schedule F/Form 4835) minus all government payments, 
hereinafter referred to as the Schedule F minus payments option. 
•  Total farm revenue based on national average prices received by farmers rather than 
actual individual farmer prices, hereinafter referred to as the calculated revenue 
option. 
 
Each of these three options was analyzed with payments to farmers being triggered at 70 and 90 
percent of the five-year Olympic average level of farm revenue.  The eight representative farms 
analyzed were typical of a Iowa corn/soybean farm; a Texas North Plains irrigated corn, 
sorghum and wheat farm; a North Dakota wheat, barley and sunflower farm; a southwest Kansas 
wheat farm; a Texas South Plains cotton farm; a Texas Rolling Plains cotton farm; a Texas 




  Based on the authors’ subjective ranking, it was concluded that the calculated revenue 
option offered farmers the greatest flexibility, with the lowest risk of moral hazard, and did not 
require farmers to surrender their tax return. 
 
  Based on the quantitative analysis, it was concluded that higher levels of revenue protection 
were preferred.  This should not be surprising inasmuch as the government was assumed to be 
absorbing the cost.  Questions remain as to whether the 90 percent option would be preferred if 
farmers had to bear the extra cost.  Farmer preferences were split between the schedule F option 
and the calculated revenue option.  Farmers located in higher risk areas tended to prefer the   2
schedule F option, while those located in lower risk areas preferred the calculated revenue 
option. 
 
  The probability of the government having to pay an indemnity was found to be less for a 
whole farm than for CAT or MCPI 65/100 coverage.  This result was expected because whole 
farm revenue in a multi-enterprise operation would logically be expected to be less variable than 
individually insured crop yields.  Thus a higher level of protection can be provided with the same 
level of government expenditures using whole farm revenue as the safety net compared with 
conventional coverage.  However, guaranteeing whole farm revenue at the 70 or 90 percent of 
the five-year Olympic average was demonstrated to be more costly than either CAT or MPCI 
65/100 coverage. 
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An Analysis of Whole Farm 
Revenue Safety Net Options in Agriculture 
 
  Historically, the US government has implemented a wide range of policy initiatives to 
support rural areas, farm production, and the agricultural economy.  Since 1933, its efforts to 
provide an income safety net to American agriculture have focused primarily on farm programs 
to support individual commodity production.  Over the past 70 years, most domestic farm 
programs were designed to stabilize agricultural prices and income through such mechanisms as 
supply management, counter-cyclical income transfers (through the target price and marketing 
loan), nonrecourse loans to enhance orderly marketing and stabilize (set minimum) prices and 
decoupled federal crop subsidies. 
  In the preface to the CBO's 1983 report titled Farm Revenue Insurance:  An Alternative 
Risk-Management Option for Crop Farmers by Director Alice M. Rivlin substantial insight into 
past farm policies and future economic conditions was shown when she stated:   
In the years ahead, crop farmers are likely to face greater financial risks and 
long-term income instability than in the past.  This is because their dependence on 
export markets exposes them to other nations' farm, economic, trade and foreign 
policies, and to the vagaries of global weather.  Although the public has long 
shared some of the risks in crop farming through commodity programs and 
federal crop insurance, commodity policy has undergone a long-term transition 
that has made farmers more dependent on markets.  Moreover, beyond their 
expense, current programs are not very effective in reducing the income 
instability caused by international events and conditions. 
 
  Given the current farm structure, it is clear that farmers and ranchers need a sustainable 
opportunity to mitigate downside risks facing their agricultural operations due to adverse markets 
as well as adverse weather conditions and disease—all of which are beyond their control.  From 
a sharp drop in the price of a single commodity to a localized weather disaster that destroys the 
farm production in a growing season, America’s farmers continue to face the hazard of serious   4
business interruption even when they practice the best possible production and risk management 
practices.  
  The farm safety net debate is focused on a way to provide an assured counter-cyclical policy 
to support farmers through the difficult periods of low market prices, low production, or a 
combination of the two.   
  Farmers have a wide range of risks to manage that are not transferable through traditional 
private insurance.  To assist them in managing those risks through a viable, sustainable Federal 
safety net for production agriculture, two questions need to be answered: 
•  What level of federal safety net should be provided through taxpayer dollars and what 
should be provided by the private sector?   
•  What type of safety net can provide the desired economic support to the farm sector in 
the most cost effective manner?   
  The objective of this study was to analyze the potential for providing a whole farm revenue 
safety net as a means of reducing farmers’ production and market risk in the context of the 
current set of farm programs.  
Experience with Crop Insurance 
  Insurance has been one of several tools utilized by the Federal government to manage crop 
production risk.  Insurance currently is being provided by private insurers through the Risk 
Management Agency (RMA) with premiums subsidized by the Federal Government.   
  RMA asserts that USDA subsidies to private insurers are effectively providing the required 
public/private partnership to manage the risk.  The programs being offered have low premium 
costs relative to the indemnification offered and, in the case of the Crop Revenue Coverage 
Program (CRC), effective coverage of real, individual farm price/yield loss.  However, neither   5
CRC nor Revenue Assurance (RA) protect long-term revenue.  Instead, these products are price 
change coverages.  The past several years have demonstrated that the Federal government has 
been required to pay substantial ad hoc supplemental safety net payments in addition to the 
insurance premium subsidies.  No existing product provides protection against situations in 
which market prices may be below long-term equilibrium.  Such long-term protection is what 
some are seeking.      
  To protect farm incomes from natural disasters or weather-induced yield risks, Federal 
involvement in crop insurance began in 1938 with the Crop Insurance Act (CBO).  An American 
Enterprise Institute (AEI) monograph on The Economics of Crop Insurance and Disaster Aid 
(Goodwin and Smith) detailed the four periods of multi-peril federal crop insurance programs 
since its inception.  The following summarizes these periods, but truncates the fourth period in 
1988 and adds two additional periods:   
•  Period One 1938-44:  The initial program covering a limited number of commodities was 
discontinued in 1944 after large subsidies were required to cover net losses. 
•  Period Two 1945-73:  The program was expanded to cover additional crops, although in 
1947 severe geographic restrictions were placed on the scope of Federal Crop Insurance 
Corporation (FCIC) operations. 
•  Period Three 1974-80:  The 1973 Farm Bill established a mandatory federal disaster 
relief program, which operated in competition with the federal insurance program.  
Disaster payments substantially reduced farmers’ incentives to purchase crop insurance, 
unless they were forced to do so.  
•  Period Four 1981-87:  With the enactment of the 1980 Federal Crop Insurance Act, the 
mandatory federal disaster program was rendered inapplicable whenever federal crop   6
insurance was available for the crop in the county.  Therefore, ad hoc disaster payments 
were made in 1981, 1982 and 1983.  The 1980 Act was expanded to cover many more 
commodities in additional regions of the country.  Private insurance companies and 
agents were allowed to sell and service crop insurance.   
•  Period Five 1988-95:  Weather adversities in 1989, forced Congress to abandon the 
policy of no disaster payments.  Therefore, periodically throughout this period ad hoc 
disaster payments were instituted as politically necessary.  Disaster payment recipients 
were required to obtain crop insurance in the subsequent year. 
•  Period Six 1996-present:  Pilot revenue insurance programs were mandated.  
Deteriorating price conditions combined with weather adversities resulted in combined 
weather and price-related disaster payments.  Subsidies were substantially increased to 
encourage the purchase of crop insurance.   
  Figure 1 summarizes the history of experience with the government cost of crop insurance 
and disaster payments since 1981.  It clearly reflects the magnitude of instability associated with 
farm production and, in recent years, farm prices.    7



































1 Source: RMA and FSA
  1999 includes $3.011 billion in market loss assistance payments.
 
  In 1998 and 1999, a total of $15.1 billion in ad hoc emergency disaster assistance and 
market loss payments were appropriated to indemnify farmers experiencing the effects of 
adverse weather and declining prices.  In 1998, not only did Congress approve $2.5 billion for 
crop and forage losses, but they also added another $3.5 billion for crop revenue losses, in 
addition to other payments for commodities such as dairy.  The total $6.1 billion ad hoc disaster 
package of 1998 was an all-time record for disaster programs.  But in 1999, ad hoc disaster relief 
legislation totaling $9 billion was enacted and signed into law.  However, from 1980-1997, ad 
hoc disaster programs averaged only $0.6 billion.   
  The unprecedented ad hoc disaster packages of 1998 and 1999 were considered necessary to 
support farm revenues, despite the Catastrophic Crop Insurance (CAT) and the proliferation of 
crop-specific insurance policies.  The primary cause of the ad hoc packages was low prices that 
adversely affect farm income.  Most of the outlays authorized under those packages were   8
allocated to income support, not compensation for crop damage.  Existing insurance products do 
not compensate for prices that are below the long-run levels.  The result, in 2000, was legislation 
to again reform and restructure crop insurance.   
  To deal with low income issues the farm program "safety net" includes fixed AMTA 
payments, farm commodity price supports, loan deficiency payments (LDPs) and/or marketing 
loan gains (MLGs), and income tax averaging.  A range of Federal crop insurance programs exist 
to deal with issues of crop failure and more recently to facilitate hedging in the event of crop 
failure.  Congress has reacted to market adversities with ad hoc government assistance.  It can be 
debated whether this system is more complicated than past programs having acreage bases and 
various types of production controls.  Despite all these numerous program initiatives, there is an 
increasing call from American agriculture for a sustainable counter-cyclical safety net.    
  These demands for a viable, sustainable farm safety net have grown due to recent global 
market developments, and the realization that neither the FAIR Act nor existing crop insurance 
programs could provide sufficient counter-cyclical support for American agriculture.   
It is this history, more than anything else that has resulted in the need to review the safety net 
concept as applied to agriculture. 
Experience with Revenue Insurance 
  Since the early 1980s, there has been considerable interest in alternative forms of revenue 
insurance.  Serious debate and studies on the issue of farm income or revenue insurance began in 
earnest during the first half of the 1980s when American agriculture was suffering from a farm 
recession and when the cost of farm programs was rising.  At the same time, there was interest in 
examining whether private or government revenue insurance could replace farm programs as the 
safety net for agriculture.     9
  Under 1981 Farm Bill provisions, Congress directed the Secretary of Agriculture to 
establish a Task Force to investigate the concept of income insurance in order to determine its 
feasibility as an acceptable alternative or substitute for existing farm/commodity programs.  The 
result was the formation of the Farm Income Protection Task Force, which issued its report in 
1983. 
  In its letter of transmittal, this Task Force concluded that due to outstanding questions about  
"...Its design, feasibility and implementation..." a substitution of farm income insurance for all 
Federal agricultural support programs was not advisable at that time.  However, a detailed 
reading of the Task Force's work provides very important insights into the political and 
economic considerations that drive and shape farm programs and policies.   
  The Task Force report specifically considered the conditions and terms for insurance 
covering gross farm production income:  
Gross farm production income is defined here as the quantity of agricultural 
commodities produced multiplied by the prices of these respective commodities.  
Gross farm production income, however, is not identical to gross farm income 
since it does not include income from such sources as:  
 
Custom work; land, pasture, or building rentals/changes in the value of 
inventories; and other types of gross farm income... 
 
It is the sense of this Task Force that any income insurance program for US 
agriculture should be based upon measures of gross farm production income as 
broadly defined above.    
 
  The Task Force further recommended that any income insurance program be expanded to 
cover all crops and livestock.  This would expand coverage to fruits, vegetables, nuts, hay, 
pasture, dairy, and livestock.    10
  With regard to the moral hazard issue, the Task Force concluded: 
An income insurance program should be structured such that it does not unduly 
increase risk taking in production practices.  That is, the plan should not provide 
protection to any farmer from adverse production and/or price changes resulting 
from imprudent or careless production or marketing decisions.  Consequently, 
whenever gross receipts are below insured levels, it would be necessary to 
distinguish losses attributable to uncontrollable forces from those resulting from 
adoption of risky or imprudent production practices.  
 
  Importantly, the Task Force emphasized that: 
 
The most direct means of discouraging excessive risk taking in production is to 
confine the level of income protection to genuine disaster relief.  Income 
protection sufficiently high to allow coverage of all costs, including profits, would 
tend to subsidize the adoption of risky practices. 
 
  A 1984 paper by Offutt, an analyst for The Farm Income Protection Insurance Program 
Task Force, provided further insight into its deliberations and recommendations by stating: 
The escalating cost of these traditional programs and concern over their 
apparently diminishing effectiveness has sparked interest in the income insurance 
idea...  
 
Proponents of income insurance have argued that it may be used to accomplish 
the same objectives addressed by existing programs but at a lower cost to the 
Federal Government and with reduced government involvement in the day-to-day 
decisions of commodity producers...  
 
Under income insurance, a producer would receive payment if income fell below 
the stipulated insured level, whether the shortfall were caused by low prices, low 
yields, or both.  In contrast, current support programs provide protection against 
declines in yield (through crop insurance) and price (through the loan rate and 
deficiency payments) without explicit coordination to meet an income goal.  Thus, 
income insurance would directly address the issue of farm income maintenance 
and stabilization... 
 
Income insurance differs from the programs currently available to commodity 
producers in that income is explicitly identified as the target variable.   
 
  Since this analysis nearly two decades ago, the Government’s approach or policies have 
emphasized more income protection without explicitly setting income as the target variable.    11
Several revenue insurance options developed by the private sector and USDA in recent years 
also contain variations of gross farm revenue coverage.  Such programs operating today include:   
•  Income Protection (IP) protects producers against reductions in gross income when a 
crop's price and/or yield deviates from early-season national price expectations. 
•  Crop Revenue Coverage (CRC) is similar to IP except that it also contains replacement 
cost coverage to protect the farmer against losses when market prices rise between 
planting and harvest.  It also contains a high price coverage option. 
•   Adjusted Gross Revenue Pilot (AGR) Insurance Program insures the revenue of the 
entire farm, rather than an individual crop, by guaranteeing a percentage of average gross 
farm revenue, including a small amount of livestock revenue.  This program has been 
available in certain counties in Florida, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, and New 
Hampshire. 
•  Revenue Assurance (RA) is also similar to IP except that RA also offers multi-crop 
coverage in a single dollar guarantee, the only product on the market that does so.  This 
differs from AGR in three respects:  (1) the guarantee is formed with an actual production 
history for each crop, (2) the planting period prices are determined on current markets 
rather than relying on historical tax records that report gross revenue, and (3) various 
combinations of crops can be insured under the multi-crop coverage while others may be 
insured or not at all.  With the high price option, RA is virtually identical to CRC for 
individual crop coverage with the exception of the multiple crop unit offered under RA. 
•  Group Risk Income Protection (GRIP) adds a price protection feature to the AGR by 
making payments to participating farmers when county revenue falls below a trigger   12
revenue level that is selected by the farmer.  The program was initially available in 1999 
only on corn and soybeans in Indiana, Illinois and Iowa where GRP has been available.  
  These current revenue or income-directed insurance programs are the direct result of 
continuing demand for government efforts to build a sustainable safety net for the farm sector. 
Purpose of Study 
  The overall objective of this study was to analyze the potential for providing a whole farm 
revenue safety net as a means of reducing production and market risk facing farmers in the 
context of the current set of farm programs.  Specific study objectives included: 
1.  To define a set of whole farm revenue safety net options. 
2.  To develop a set of representative crop and livestock farms including a realistic 
history of experience with yield and price variability. 
3.  To evaluate the whole farm revenue safety net options on a whole farm basis 
against scenarios that reflect the current set of farm price, income and risk 
reduction programs. 
4.  To draw conclusions regarding the economic impacts of whole farm revenue 
safety net policies. 
Options for Analysis 
  By prior agreement with the Risk Management Agency, a total of nine different safety net 
program alternatives were evaluated to determine their economic impacts on selected 
representative farms.  The alternative levels of coverage were analyzed for three different safety 
net options.  In addition, CAT, MPCI and a No Insurance option were analyzed as reference 
points.   13
•  The A series whole farm safety net option defined whole farm revenue as the total farm 
revenue reported on the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) income tax schedule for farmers 
(Schedule F or Form 4835).  This definition of whole farm revenue includes all farm 
receipts, such as market crop and livestock receipts, AMTA (or PFC) payments, loan 
deficiency payments, disaster payments, CRP payments, and income earned from other 
farming activities.  The two A series options analyzed assumed trigger levels of 70 and 
90 percent of the 5-year Olympic average for total farm revenue.  The Olympic average is 
defined as the simple average of the 3 years remaining after the highest and lowest values 
are excluded from the five years.  For example, under the 70 percent option, when annual 
total revenue fell below the trigger level of 70 percent the farm received a safety net 
payment equal to the difference between realized total revenue and 70 percent of the 5-
year Olympic average of total revenue.   
•  The B series whole farm safety net option defined whole farm revenue as the total farm 
revenue reported on Schedule F and Form 4835 minus government farm program payments 
of all kinds.  Thus the total revenue for the B series was the revenue earned from the 
market for both crop and livestock enterprises.  The two B series options analyzed assumed 
trigger levels of 70 and 90 percent of the 5-year Olympic average for market revenue.  For 
example, under the 90 percent option, when annual market revenue fell below the trigger 
level of 90 percent, the farm received a safety net payment equal to the difference between 
realized market revenue and 90 percent of the 5-year Olympic average of market revenue.  
It is important to note that while the B series excludes the impact of other forms of 
government payments from the determination of the program payment for this safety net 
option, the farms still receive these other government payments.   14
•  The C series whole farm safety net option defined whole farm revenue as the total value 
of production based on farm level yields and national average prices rather than on the 
price received on an individual farm.  A 5-year Olympic average of this total value of 
production was calculated based on the farm’s certified planted acres for each crop in the 
current year, 5 years of actual or county average assigned yield for each crop, and 5 years 
of historical national prices.  Similar calculations were performed for livestock farms to 
arrive at a 5-year Olympic average of total value of production.  The two C series options 
analyzed assumed trigger levels of 70 and 90 percent of the 5-year Olympic average for 
total value of production.  For example, under the 90 percent option, when total value of 
production fell below the trigger level, the farm received a safety net payment equal to 
the difference between realized total value of production and 90 percent of the 5-year 
Olympic average.  This option does not require reliance on IRS tax returns, but does 
require planted acreage and yield data.   
•  The MPCI 65/100 program was included as a point of comparison.  The level of coverage 
analyzed for the MPCI option was the 65 percent yield election at the 100 percent price 
election or 65/100.  Because premiums were not available for the A, B, and C options, 
MPCI was analyzed under the assumption that the product had a 100 percent subsidy, i.e., 
MPCI was free.   
•  The CAT program was included to provide another reference point.  The CAT premium 
was assumed to be set to zero for the analysis. 
•  The No Insurance scenario assumed that the farm had no safety net program, not even 
hail insurance.  This option becomes the baseline option for comparing the benefits to be   15
derived for the alternative whole farm safety net programs, as well as for free MPCI and 
CAT.          
Trigger Levels 
  The 70 and 90 percent trigger levels were set based on a preliminary analysis of whole farm 
safety net options where trigger levels in the range of 50 to 95 percent were analyzed.  At trigger 
levels less than 70 percent (50, 55, 60, and 65 percent), whole farm revenue safety net programs 
provided virtually no safety net for the majority of the representative farms analyzed.  The reason 
for this result is that total revenue is less variable than yields, so the low trigger levels used for 
MPCI (50, 55, 60, 65 percent) did not provide an adequate safety net for revenue. 
  At the upper end, a 90 percent trigger was used because, based on AFPC experience, it was 
concluded that higher trigger levels would foster increased production, inflate land values and 
distort economic incentives to maintain competitiveness. 
Definitions of Guaranteed Revenue 
  The A series option used a total revenue definition for guaranteed income.  This value was 
easily determined from the Schedule F or Form 4835 income tax form.  However, it included 
three kinds of risk:  production risk on yield, price risk from marketing, and farm program risk.  
There is also the risk that the farmer would change the enterprise mix, which in this analysis was 
held constant.  Farm program payments have reduced revenue risk by providing payments in low 
income years and letting the market determine revenue in good years.  The counter-cyclical 
nature of disaster payments and market loss adjustment payments (double AMTAs) over the past 
three years provide evidence of this phenomena.  Insuring such a revenue series could be double 
jeopardy for the Congress, increasing government payments is costly but it reduces safety net 
payments, and cutting government payments saves money but increases safety net payments.     16
  The B series option removed the government payments for income support and disaster 
assistance from the guaranteed revenue determination.  The resulting guaranteed revenue is 
impacted only by production and marketing risk and does not depend on the income support 
payment policies of Congress.  In practice, the values for this definition of guaranteed revenue 
can be obtained from the income tax schedule for a farm.  However, this insurable revenue, like 
Series A, does not adjust for short-run changes in crop mix or farm size.  A farmer would not 
likely receive safety net payments for several years if the farm added acres or switched to higher-
valued crops.  Similarly, a farmer could virtually guarantee a safety net payment by reducing 
acreage and/or switching to lower-valued crops.  
  The C series option used a definition for guaranteed revenue that excluded disaster and 
income support payments, and values current production at national prices.  Total guaranteed 
revenue was calculated based on 5 years of actual yields (or county average yields if actuals are 
not available for each crop), multiplied by the national average price for each of the 5 preceding 
years and the current year’s acres planted to the crop.  Once revenue was determined under this 
process for each of the previous 5 years using the current certified acreage, then an Olympic 
average was determined.  In the case of livestock the previous 5 years number of head sold or 
pounds of milk sold per animal unit constituted the average production values.  The current 
year’s intended production was based on current herd size, so year-to-year adjustments in 
number of sows or cows were accounted for in the calculation of guaranteed value of production.  
The appropriate years’ national price was used for valuing historical and current crop and 
livestock production, to avoid the problem of different regional prices, different marketing 
periods, and different marketing abilities of farmers.   17
  An additional adjustment to the C series guaranteed value of production was made to correct 
for the adverse effect that catastrophic losses can have on the 5-year Olympic guaranteed 
revenue average.  Farms who experienced a loss received a positive adjustment to the 5-year 
Olympic average value of production equal to the safety net payment.  This adjustment 
compensated for the downside effect that an occasional catastrophic loss had on the general long-
term guaranteed value of production.    
Methodology 
  A whole farm simulation model (FLIPSIM) developed by AFPC scientists and used for 
farm level policy analyses was modified and used for the present study.  The economic impacts 
of alternative whole farm safety net options on the viability of farms were simulated by the 
model.  Representative farms were simulated for different production regions to determine the 
likely impacts of a whole farm safety net program on actual farming situations in major 
production regions.  Inferences as to the effects of the different safety net options were made, 
based on the simulated effects on selected economic indicators for farm viability.  
  Monte Carlo simulation was used because a large database of historical revenues for farmers 
was not available for this analysis.  The Monte Carlo procedure used to simulate the 
representative farms insured that each safety net option was simulated for the same stochastic 
prices and yield variability for each farm in a region.  The stochastic prices and yields for the 
crops and livestock enterprises were simulated using multivariate empirical distributions 
estimated from 10 years of local yields and national prices.   
  The simulation period was for 2001-2005 and mean annual prices for these years came from 
the January 2000 FAPRI Baseline, which assumes continuation of the 1996 Farm Bill.  Each 
farm was simulated for 100 iterations over the 2001-2005 planning horizon.  The results of   18
simulating the safety net options were reported for 2005 to avoid biasing the result by reporting a 
transition year in a program that used a 5-year Olympic average.    
  For each study area 100 representative farms were simulated to estimate the information 
necessary to define the distribution of economic payoffs/benefits for the alternative safety net 
options.  Because each farm was simulated 100 times for 2005, the simulated data base consisted 
of 10,000 observations for each safety net option.  The resulting database provided the necessary 
information to present the results in a probabilistic context.  Probability distributions for the 
safety net payments and annual net cash farms income are presented in the results section.  
Additionally, summary statistics were calculated for key output variables such as probability of 
the farm having a cash flow deficit and the probability of the farm losing real net worth.  
Representative Farms 
  The AFPC maintains representative crop and livestock farms in major production regions 
across the country.  These representative farms were developed from producer panel interviews 
and have been validated with the farmers on the panels.  The farms were developed to represent 
commercial scale farms in the selected production regions.  Panel members were selected based 
on their farm size, crops or livestock produced, history of participating in extension programs, 
and recognition as local leaders in their communities.  Local county agricultural extension agents 
were asked to identify panel members and to facilitate the panel farm meetings.  A list of 
facilitators and farmers who helped develop the representative farms for this study is included as 
Appendix II to this report. 
  By prior agreement with the Risk Management Agency, representative farms in North 
Dakota, Iowa, Kansas, Texas and Indiana were included in the study.  Each farm was 
representative of large-scale commercial farms in their area and was operated as a family farm.    19
The representative farms produced the typical crops and in the normal crop mix for the region 
and used the typical production practices for these crops.  The representative farms were updated 
during 1999-2000.  The characteristics for the representative farms used for the study are 
summarized in Table 1. 
    To account for differences in crop yield risk across farmers the representative farm 
structure was replicated to make 100 farms, each having different yield histories and thus yield 
risk for the crops.  Actual 10-year yield histories of producers who purchased MPCI in the 
counties where the representative farms are from were the source of different yield histories.  
Actual yield histories for farms purchasing crop insurance were obtained from RMA.  Each 
representative farm was setup to have multiple units (multiple fields of each crop) and the 10- 
year yield histories for actual producers’ fields were used to populate the yield histories for the 
different units on the 100 farms derived from each representative farm.    
  The representative dairy farm structure simulated for this study was derived by making 100 
representative dairy farms, each with a different milk production history.  Ten-year yield 
histories for annual milk production per cow on dairy farms in Texas were obtained from DHIA 
milk production records.  The milk production histories were used to populate the yield histories 
for the 100 replications of the typical 825 cow Central Texas dairy farm. 
  The representative 1200 sow hog farm structure in Indiana was derived by making 100 
representative farms with different production histories.  Crop yield histories for corn, soybeans 
and wheat were treated like the other crops farms.  The annual number of pigs sold per sow was 
made stochastic using the actual variability in hog production for farms in the Indiana and 
Illinois area that was reported by Boland. 
   20
 







Cash Receipts in 
1999 ($1,000) 
 
Crops and Acreage 
 
IAG2400     380  2,020     598  Corn  1,200 
       Soybeans  1,200 
TXNP6700 1,100  5,600 1,606  Corn  3,350 
        Sorghum     335 
       Wheat  1,675 
NDW4850  1,701  3,149     679  Wheat  2,585 
        Barley     470 
        Soybeans     705 
        Sunflower     940 
KSSW3180     330  2,850     331  Wheat  2,258 
        Sorghum     625 
        Corn       56 
        Soybeans       87 
        Hay     127 
TXSP3697 1,627  2,070 1,067  Cotton  2,665 
        Peanuts     285 
TXRP2500     400  2,100     233  Cotton  1,240 
        Wheat     825 
TXCD825     460         0  3,335  Cows     825 
        Silage     430 
        Haylage       20 
INH1200 1,038  2,162  2,740  Sows  1,200 
       Corn  2,066 
       Soybeans  1,034 
        Wheat     100 
Source:  Richardson, J.W., et. al.  Representative Farms Economic Outlook for the January 2000 
FAPRI/AFPC Baseline, TAMU, Department of Agricultural Economics, AFPC WP 00-1, January 2000. 
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Criteria for Program Comparison 
  In this study each of the program alternatives was measured based on the following criteria: 
•  Simplicity 
•  Flexibility 
•  Program integrity 
•  Revenue risk 
•  Ability to protect net cash farm income 
•  Reduce probability of a cash flow deficit 
•  Reduce probability of a loss in real net worth  
•  Government cost 
The first three criteria are subjective/qualitative and based on the authors’ experience.  The last 
five are quantitative and based on the results of the simulation analysis. 
Subjective/Qualitative Criteria Comparison 
Simplicity 
  The program should be easily understood and implemented without undue paperwork for 
the participating producers.  In Table 2 the authors assess the simplicity of each of the five 
general program alternatives on a rank-order basis with 1 being the simplest to understand and 
administer and 5 being the most complicated.  Obviously from an understanding and paperwork 
perspective, the No Insurance alternative is the simplest due to a lack of government 
involvement.  CAT/MPCI were judged to be the most complex with the whole farm revenue 
options falling between. 
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Simplicity 3  2  4  5  1 
Flexibility 5  4  2  3  1 
Program Integrity  4  5  2  3  1 
* 1 is highest, 5 is lowest based on the specific criteria. 
 
  The B series would be rated second due to the participating entity only having to provide the 
market sales information included on Schedule F of their tax return if they are an operator and/or 
Form 4835 if renting land on a share basis. 
  The A series would be rated only slightly more complicated than the B series due to having 
to report the inclusion of all government payments and insurance indemnities.  This information, 
however, is also readily available in the Schedule F and Form 4835, respectively. 
  The C series is more complicated than either the A or B series because the participating 
entity would be required to certify planted acreage and yields by farming practice before 
guaranteed payment levels could be calculated.  Since market price would be determined at the 
national level, as the average for the preceding five years, price reporting would not be a burden 
on farmers. 
  The free CAT and MPCI 65/100 insurance alternatives would have basically the same 
complication as the C series in that the entities would have to certify planting yields and farming 
practices.  However, since the price guarantee has to be made prior to the insurance decision, 
these alternatives are rated slightly more complex than the C series. 
Flexibility  
  One of the most universally accepted provisions of the 1996 FAIR Act was the inclusion of 
production flexibility for the major crop producers (with the exception of fruits and vegetables   23
where there is no production history).  The No Insurance alternative would be the most flexible 
since there would be no more restriction on the planting decisions of producing entities than 
currently exist in order to receive AMTA contract payments. 
  The C series would be the second most flexible alternative since income guarantees would 
be based on certified acreage, yields and an observed national price (Table 2).  Planting of fruits 
and vegetables would not be any more constrained under this option than currently exists in 
order to receive AMTA contract payments. 
  The free CAT and MPCI 65/100 insurance alternatives would rank third in flexibility 
provisions primarily because of the projected price used in establishing the guarantee.  The price 
relationship among projected prices for each commodity would influence planting decisions. 
  The B series would be fourth because flexibility decisions could be distorted.  That is, since 
a program payment would be triggered based only on the market value of commodities produced 
there would be a disincentive for switching from lower value to higher value production.  
Conversely, there may be an incentive for switching from high value to lower value production.  
In addition, the adoption of yield enhancing technologies could be slowed. 
  The A series possesses all the same flexibility problems as the B series with the addition of 
the impact government programs have on the calculation of guaranteed revenue.  Government 
program payments paid in the base calculation years will impact the types of crops grown and 
exacerbate the incentive to move from higher value to lower value production or vice-versa. 
Program Integrity 
  This rating is based on the author’s view of how easy it would be to monitor the program to 
lessen any moral hazard or fraud.  Obviously, since the No Insurance would only have current   24
AMTA and marketing loan provisions it would be the least likely to suffer from moral hazard or 
fraud. 
  The C series would be second in the ability to maintain program integrity.  Since acreage 
and yield are certified for the whole farm, there is less chance of selective farming practices or 
moving production that may exist in the insurance program, which pays, based on farming units. 
  The CAT/MPCI insurance programs would be ranked third overall followed by the A series.  
The biggest problem with the A series is that many entities use cash accounting in reporting 
Schedule F and Form 4835 revenue.  Therefore, there would be substantial opportunity to adjust 
revenue from year to year.  In addition, operations can change from higher value to lower value 
production, which could trigger program payments in the near term.  The use of actual market 
receipts also offers the potential for trading and program manipulation. 
  The B series has all the problems associated with the A series.  It is ranked last because 
there is no government monitoring at all since the guarantee level of revenue is based on market 
receipts and does not include other forms of government payments.  Thus, the B series would 
have the least ability to exercise oversight. 
Quantitative Criteria Comparison 
  Each program alternative was simulated based on the price and yield risk for the eight 
selected farms maintained by AFPC.  A representative sample of yield risk was applied to the 
basic farm structure to generate 100 farm operations with unique historical yield risk.  Each of 
these 100 farms in each area was then simulated for 100 iterations based on observed risk.  
Therefore, for each of the eight farms the following quantitative results are based on 10,000 
observations (100 farms x 100 iterations) reflecting the range of yield and price risk in the 
region.   25
  Since all the revenue triggers for the A, B and C series included guarantees calculated on a 
5-year Olympic moving average, this report focuses on the results for 2005.  This year was 
selected because its revenue guarantees are calculated over the period 2000-2004 dropping the 
high and low revenue.  The results, therefore, are not impacted by ad hoc emergency disaster and 
market loss assistance that may come into play for transition years.  AMTA and marketing loan 
provisions in the 1996 farm bill were assumed to be continued at 2002 levels for the period 
2003-2005. 
Revenue Risk 
  The level of risk associated with total receipts is detailed in Table 3.  The A 90 scenario 
refers to A series whole farm revenue insurance at the 90 percent level (Table 3).   
  As one would expect, the total receipts were found to be the lowest and the variability, as 
measured by the coefficient of variation (CV), the highest for the No Insurance scenario.   
  Comparing the CV across farms under the No Insurance scenario gives an indication of the 
relative risk faced by farms representative of each region and crop mix.  The greatest revenue 
risk is faced by the Texas Rolling Plains (TXRP) farm with a CV of 37 percent.  Dryland cotton 
and wheat production are highly risky ventures in the region. 
  The Texas Southern Plains (TXSP) cotton and peanut farm and the Kansas South Central 
Wheat (KSSW) farm face the next greatest risk with CVs of 26 percent.  The TXSP farm has 
approximately 15 percent of its acreage under irrigation and produces 285 acres of peanuts both 
of which reduces its risk relative to its TXRP counterpart. 
  The North Dakota wheat/feedgrains/oilseed farm (NDG) has a CV of 21 percent while the 
Iowa feedgrain/oilseed farm IAG and the Texas Northern Plains farm feedgrain/wheat (TXNP) Table  3.  Revenue Risk for Selected Representative Farms Under Alternative Whole Farm Saftey Net Options. 
Safety Net and Insurance Scenarios
Farms A70 A90 B70 B90 C70 C90 CAT MPCI NOINS
IAG2400
Mean ($1,000) 639.33 651.55 641.66 658.78 641.65 660.79 639.34 643.28 638.38
CV (%) 17.74 15.05 17.23 15.13 17.23 14.84 17.93 17.26 18.06
TXNP6700
Mean ($1,000) 1816.89 1844.06 1828.98 1882.89 1866.89 1931.79 1827.97 1848.97 1815.35
CV (%) 18.29 16.54 17.57 15.41 16.22 14.12 17.93 17.19 18.46
NDW4850
Mean ($1,000) 779.02 795.36 779.71 795.70 780.04 798.66 783.94 799.57 778.61
CV (%) 20.42 18.11 20.30 18.30 20.24 17.93 20.16 19.32 20.51
KSSW3180
Mean ($1,000) 412.14 429.92 413.99 429.79 413.37 430.46 413.93 426.54 408.50
CV (%) 24.74 20.39 24.33 21.17 24.51 20.96 24.86 22.35 26.16
TXSP3697
Mean ($1,000) 972.98 1017.81 970.92 998.07 970.89 999.52 979.62 1011.21 963.88
CV (%) 24.16 19.22 24.52 21.55 24.51 21.28 24.00 21.25 25.62
TXRP2500
Mean ($1,000) 240.16 256.12 239.20 248.27 239.93 251.30 240.70 251.33 234.72
CV (%) 33.96 27.35 34.48 30.54 34.07 29.28 35.01 31.60 37.30
TXCD825
Mean ($1,000) 3813.89 3826.64 3813.87 3823.25 3813.80 3816.51 3813.78
CV (%) 8.48 7.97 8.48 8.08 8.49 8.33 8.49
INH1200
Mean ($1,000) 3021.78 3112.45 3021.84 3097.24 3021.57 3088.45 3017.96
CV (%) 13.41 10.60 13.41 11.01 13.44 11.48 13.66
Due to the large number of replications all differences in the values should be assumed to be real.  Therefore, it is possible to rank the options by
differences in the means and the coefficients of variation.  27
farms’ CV was found to be 18 percent.  The TXNP farm is irrigated while the IAG farm has the 
natural resource and climate base reflective of the Corn Belt. 
  The two livestock operations have the least revenue variability.  The Indiana 
hog/feedgrain/oilseed operation (INH) experiences a CV of 14 percent.  The Central Texas dairy 
(TXCD) has the lowest CV of 8 percent.  Therefore, based on the origination and differential in risk 
exposure it is unlikely that one risk reduction scenario will dominate all others across all regions. 
  If the alternative scenarios were evaluated based on average total receipts, the NDW farm 
would prefer MPCI 65/100, the IAG, KSSW, and TXNP would prefer C series at the 90 percent 
level (C90), while the TXRP, TXSP, TXCD and INH would prefer A90.  If the lowest CV for 
receipts is the performance variable, then the NDW, IAG and TXNP farms would prefer C90 while 
the five other farms would prefer A90. 
  Therefore, of the comparable options, the A90 and C90 scenarios appear to be the most  
frequently preferred if total revenue and reduction of revenue risk were the target criteria.  Both the 
A series and C series have revenue adjustment mechanisms that stabilize the downside risk 
associated with an Olympic moving average guarantee. 
Ability to Protect Net Cash Farm Income 
  Because of commercial farms’ heavy dependence on purchased inputs, a small change in total 
receipts can have major impacts on a farm’s net margin.  Therefore, the ability to generate positive 
net cash farm income (NCI) was chosen as a performance criteria.  Net cash farm income is defined 
as total receipts including government payments, less all cash expenses.  It does not include capital 
replacement, family living withdrawals, principal payment on loans or accrued taxes.  For a farm to 
survive, NCI must provide for these revenue changes as well as for the future growth of the farm.  
The average NCI and the probability of a negative NCI is included for each of the eight farming 
operations across scenarios in Table 4.   28
  If the highest average NCI is the goal of these safety net programs, the C90 scenario would be 
preferred by the IAG, KSSW, and TXNP operations.  A90 would be preferred by TXSP, TXRP, 
INH and TXCD.  MPCI 65/100 is preferred by the NDW farm. 
  If preventing a negative NCI were the criteria, then the A90 scenario would be preferred by 
NDW (0%), IAG (0.3%), KSSW (0%), TXSP (0%), TXRP (23.3%), TXCD (0%), and INH (8.3%).  
The C90 scenario would be preferred by TXNP (1.2%). 
  The A90 and C90 options appear to be preferred if maintaining the highest level of NCI and 
preventing a negative NCI are the program goals. 
Reducing the Probability of Cash Flow Deficit 
  The NCI criteria discussed in the previous section excluded capital replacement, family living 
withdrawals, principal payments and taxes.  If the NCI is not sufficient to cover these financial 
demands, then a cash flow deficit will occur.  This deficit would have to be covered by the owners 
of the operations personal wealth or be refinanced as carryover debt by an external lender.  
Therefore, a performance measure for the proposed safety net alternatives could be the probability 
of a cash flow deficit (Table 5).  
  The C90 scenario would be preferred by IAG (26.7%), KSSW (39.6%), and TXNP (31.4%).  
A90 would be preferred by TXSP (20.3%), TXRP (84.1%), TXCD (1.2%) and INH (53.8%).  
MPCI 65/100 is preferred by the NDW (45.7%) farm although it is closely followed by C90 
(47.3%).  Therefore, the A90 and C90 scenarios appear the most dominate when it comes to 
preventing a cash flow deficit on the operations analyzed. Table 4. Ability to Protect Net Cash Income for Selected Representative Farms Under Alternative Safety Net Options.
Safety Net and Insurance Scenarios
Farms A70 A90 B70 B90 C70 C90 CAT MPCI NOINS
IAG2400
Mean ($1,000) 188.48 204.57 191.43 211.81 191.54 214.52 188.34 193.55 187.12
Prob. Neg. NCI (%) 5.07 0.31 3.57 1.24 3.55 0.85 5.39 3.95 5.62
TXNP6700
Mean ($1,000) 385.24 417.18 399.32 459.54 406.89 479.21 397.94 422.13 383.37
Prob. Neg. NCI (%) 8.78 3.05 6.90 2.31 3.24 1.16 6.92 4.14 9.01
NDW4850
Mean ($1,000) 241.45 261.22 242.20 260.45 242.45 263.34 246.51 263.64 240.62
Prob. Neg. NCI (%) 2.39 0.00 2.13 0.55 1.97 0.33 1.96 0.74 2.69
KSSW3180
Mean ($1,000) 185.20 202.99 187.06 202.86 186.44 203.53 187.00 199.60 181.57
Prob. Neg. NCI (%) 0.22 0.00 0.44 0.01 0.49 0.00 0.93 0.00 2.53
TXSP3697
Mean ($1,000) 266.42 318.59 262.78 292.88 263.15 295.93 273.35 310.11 254.85
Prob. Neg. NCI (%) 5.18 0.01 6.28 2.08 6.24 1.07 5.07 0.90 8.99
TXRP2500
Mean ($1,000) 25.99 46.13 23.94 34.46 25.16 38.99 26.66 40.93 18.73
Prob. Neg. NCI (%) 41.25 23.33 41.98 33.85 41.50 30.39 40.21 30.63 44.29
TXCD825
Mean ($1,000) 987.80 1000.83 987.78 997.40 987.73 991.04 987.69
Prob. Neg. NCI (%) 0.08 0.00 0.08 0.03 0.10 0.03 0.10
INH1200
Mean ($1,000) 302.10 399.91 302.15 383.14 311.33 384.15 298.11
Prob. Neg. NCI (%) 19.60 8.32 19.67 9.77 19.03 11.49 20.38Table  5.  Probabilitiy of Cash Flow Deficits for Selected Representative Farms Under Alternative Safety Net Options.
Safety Net and Insurance Scenarios
Farms A70 A90 B70 B90 C70 C90 CAT MPCI NOINS
IAG2400
Prob. Deficits (%) 38.18 33.38 36.49 28.43 36.47 26.73 37.95 36.67 38.33
TXNP6700
Prob. Deficits (%) 49.09 46.1 47.74 35.76 47.83 31.42 47.88 45.2 49.2
NDW4850
Prob. Deficits (%) 50.89 49.19 50.87 47.66 50.86 47.25 49.99 45.7 50.98
KSSW3180
Prob. Deficits (%) 48.91 42.69 48.21 40 48.35 39.55 47.69 43.54 48.75
TXSP3697
Prob. Deficits (%) 38.7 20.25 38.9 30.24 38.9 29.57 36.48 27.08 40.22
TXRP2500
Prob. Deficits (%) 88.57 84.13 89.13 88.02 88.9 86.42 87.86 84.34 89.47
TXCD825
Prob. Deficits (%) 1.83 1.16 1.83 1.28 1.85 1.81 1.5 1.11 1.84
INH1200
Prob. Deficits (%) 65.73 53.81 65.64 56.67 62.08 60.74 54.32 46.87 65.85  31
Reducing Probability of a Loss in Real Net Worth 
  Protecting a farm’s real wealth is a common performance variable.  The information in Table 6 
provides the probability that the operators can maintain real net worth when comparing the balance 
sheet equity on December 31, 2005 against beginning net worth in 2000, after adjusting for inflation 
over the period. 
  The A90 scenario is preferred by TXSP (2.2%), IAG (9.4%), NDW (19.6%), and TXRP 
(65.7%).  The INH (10.1%) and TXNP (9.6%) operators prefer the C90 scenario.  The TXCD and 
the KSSW are basically indifferent to the alternative scenarios as the probability of losing net worth 
is less than 1.3 percent under all scenarios. 
Government Cost 
  In the previous sections the overwhelming favorites by almost any measure are the A90 and 
C90 alternatives.  However, the cost of the program is also an important factor in any decision to 
adopt a specific safety net policy.  The average government cost as well the average cost as a 
percentage of the observed maximum and the probability of a program payment is indicated in 
Table 7. 
  Average government cost is greatest under the A90 alternative for the TXSP ($53,934), TXRP 
($21,394), TXCD ($12,861), and INH ($94,494).  To put these values in perspective the TXSP farm 
received $62,600 in emergency market loss assistance payments in 2000.  The TXRP received 
$28,440 in 2000, while the TXCD received $3,442 and the INH received $69,890.  Thus, for the 
crop farms the average 2005 government payment from these programs were from 75-85 percent of 
the emergency payments paid in 2000.  Since dairy and hogs do not receive substantial direct 
government support, the payments under the A90 series are significantly higher. Table 6.  Probability of Loss in Real Net Worth for Selected Representative Farms Under Alternative Safety Net Options.
Safety Net and Insurance Scenarios
Farms A70 A90 B70 B90 C70 C90 CAT MPCI NOINS
IAG2400
Prob. Loss RNW (%) 21.23 9.35 18.47 10.67 18.13 9.37 21.71 17.84 22.54
TXNP6700
Prob. Loss RNW (%) 26.22 19.52 23.68 14.13 20.14 9.56 23.59 18.37 26.52
NDW4850
Prob. Loss RNW (%) 36.12 19.56 35.88 25.21 36.17 25.21 34.77 26.37 37.48
KSSW3180
Prob. Loss RNW (%) 1.10 1.00 1.18 1.00 1.15 1.00 1.07 1.00 1.29
TXSP3697
Prob. Loss RNW (%) 11.99 2.18 14.69 8.98 14.05 6.34 11.41 3.98 16.59
TXRP2500
Prob. Loss RNW (%) 75.89 65.66 77.46 73.53 76.84 70.80 75.39 66.57 79.47
TXCD825
Prob. Loss RNW (%) 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
INH1200
Prob. Loss RNW (%) 15.16 10.22 15.14 10.90 14.57 10.14 15.32Table  7.  Government Costs for Slelcted Representative Farms Under Alternative Safety Net Options.
Safety Net and Insurance Scenarios
Farms A70 A90 B70 B90 C70 C90 CAT MPCI NOINS
IAG2400
Mean Cost ($1,000) 0.94 13.17 3.28 20.39 3.27 22.40 0.95 4.90 0.00
Mean Cost/Observed Max 0.90 5.65 2.28 8.00 2.26 8.63 4.76 6.78 0.00
Prob. Indemnity (%) 3.09 20.26 7.52 25.83 7.52 28.26 26.37 47.15 0.00
TXNP6700
Mean Cost ($1,000) 1.54 28.71 13.63 67.54 51.53 116.43 12.63 33.62 0.00
Mean Cost/Observed Max 0.28 3.06 2.37 7.18 5.19 8.63 6.78 7.21 0.00
Prob. Indemnity (%) 1.52 19.40 10.33 26.50 75.50 80.30 64.63 73.28 0.00
NDW4850
Mean Cost ($1,000) 0.41 16.74 1.10 17.08 1.43 20.04 5.32 20.96 0.00
Mean Cost/Observed Max 0.26 4.99 0.64 5.15 0.86 6.19 9.62 13.68 0.00
Prob. Indemnity (%) 1.15 24.80 2.85 22.76 3.74 27.53 57.92 76.18 0.00
KSSW3180
Mean Cost ($1,000) 3.63 21.42 5.49 21.29 4.87 21.96 5.43 18.03 0.00
Mean Cost/Observed Max 2.00 7.02 2.52 6.69 2.35 6.98 9.00 11.78 0.00
Prob. Indemnity (%) 8.86 34.03 12.34 32.59 11.37 33.90 76.19 86.20 0.00
TXSP3697
Mean Cost ($1,000) 9.09 53.93 7.04 34.19 7.01 35.64 15.74 47.32 0.00
Mean Cost/Observed Max 2.18 8.04 1.64 5.18 1.77 5.79 12.89 14.96 0.00
Prob. Indemnity (%) 9.81 34.33 7.82 24.82 8.36 27.06 59.99 71.59 0.00
TXRP2500
Mean Cost ($1,000) 5.44 21.39 4.47 13.54 5.20 16.58 5.98 16.60 0.00
Mean Cost/Observed Max 3.51 9.41 2.83 6.00 3.18 7.08 17.82 20.05 0.00
Prob. Indemnity (%) 18.16 41.93 16.09 33.02 17.44 35.98 89.23 95.44 0.00
TXCD825
Mean Cost ($1,000) 0.11 12.86 0.09 9.47 0.03 2.73 0.00
Mean Cost/Observed Max 0.02 0.97 0.02 0.73 0.01 0.26 0.00
Prob. Indemnity (%) 0.06 6.80 0.06 4.79 0.01 1.49 0.00
INH1200
Mean Cost ($1,000) 3.82 94.49 3.89 79.29 3.61 70.50 0.00
Mean Cost/Observed Max 0.43 5.62 0.45 4.95 0.36 3.88 0.00
Prob. Indemnity (%) 2.13 31.63 2.20 31.37 1.78 22.38 0.00  34
  The highest expenditure observed over the 10,000 iterations for each farm under the A90 
scenario was $670,560 for the TXSP operations, $227,480 for TXRP, $1,331,950 for TXCD and 
$1,682,580 for INH.  These high levels of government costs were observed with a probability of 1 
percent (see Appendix III Tables 5-8). 
  Average government cost for the C90 alternative is highest for TXNP ($116,434), IAG 
($22,402), KSSW ($21,957) and NDW ($20,044).  These same farms received the following 
amounts of emergency government assistance in 2000; TXNP ($123,040), IAG ($38,110),  
KSSW ($42,430) and NDW ($52,310).  Therefore, the average payment under C90 in 2005 relative 
to emergency payments in 2000, range from 38 percent for the NDW farm to 95 percent for the 
TXNP operation. 
  The highest expenditure observed over the 10,000 iterations under the C90 scenario was 
$1,348,490 for the TXNP operation, $259,540 for IAG, $314,420 for KSSW and $324,090 for 
NDW (see Appendix III Tables 1-4). 
Summary and Conclusions 
  Seeking a simplified alternative to current farm programs while protecting the financial integrity 
of agriculture has proven to be a difficult task, not only in the United States but around the world.  
Accomplishing this task through the use of a whole farm safety net appears to hold potential. 
  This study analyzed the farm level impacts of three whole farm revenue options at two levels 
of coverage (70 percent and 90 percent of the 5-year Olympic average).  Comparisons were 
provided with CAT coverage and MPCI 60/100 coverage and no insurance.  The representative 
farms utilized for analytical purposes were developed by Agricultural and Food Policy Center 
scientists at Texas A&M University with the assistance of panels of actual producers.  Actual yield 
experiences were obtained from the Risk Management Agency/USDA. Price variability was based 
on actual market experience.   35
Whole Farm Options Analyzed 
  The whole farm revenue options analyzed included: 
•  Total farm revenue as reported on IRS Schedule F or Form 4835. 
•  Total farm revenue as reported on IRS Schedule F or Form 4835 minus government 
payments of all kinds. 
•  Total value of production based on national average prices, the farm’s certified planted acres 
for each crop, and actual or county average yields. 
Subjective Ranking 
  A subjective/qualitative rank ordering indicated that no insurance was the simplest, provided 
farmers the most flexibility and, obviously, had no problems with program integrity.  However, it 
also provided no insurance safety net.  Among the other options, the whole farm revenue option 
based on average prices with certified planted acres and yields offered the greatest flexibility with 
the lowest risk of moral hazard (greatest program integrity).  It also did not require that the farmers 
surrender their income tax returns. 
Quantitative Impacts 
  Quantitatively, the options were evaluated on the basis of their impacts on farm revenue risk, 
protection of net cash income, probability of a cash flow deficit and the probability of a loss in real 
net worth with the following summary results: 
•  The higher 90 percent level of whole farm revenue was preferred over all other options. 
•  Two whole farm revenue options that were preferred included: 
   Total farm revenue as reported on the relevant IRS farm tax form. 
   Total farm revenue calculated from farms’ actual acres, actual yields and national 
historical average prices.   36
The results suggested that higher risk farms tended to prefer the use of income defined by income 
tax schedules while lower risk areas preferred a calculated total farm revenue. 
  In summary, government costs were generally higher under the whole farm revenue options than 
under the CAT and MPCI options, but the probability of a payment was generally lower.  Higher 
levels of protection obviously generated higher government costs, however, the level of government 
costs can be adjusted by changing the percentage of whole farm revenue coverage.  The probability 
that the government would have to pay an indemnity under whole farm revenue coverage is generally 
lower than under either CAT or MPCI 60/100.  This is because farm revenue would be expected to be 
less variable than yields or prices for an individual crop or livestock enterprise. 
Unanswered Questions 
  This study clearly indicates that a whole farm revenue safety net has potential for simplifying 
existing farm programs while protecting the financial integrity of US agriculture.  While this study 
represents the most complete analysis of whole farm revenue coverage, there are two main issues 
that need to be addressed: 
•  This study assumed that the level of aggregate production and prices remains the same.  
Except for the no insurance option, these assumptions appeared reasonable.  Yet they need 
to be analyzed. 
•  This study assumed, except for the no insurance option, that current farm programs remain 
in place.  A study now needs to be completed of the potential for removing certain elements 
of the existing program under various levels and types of whole farm revenue coverage.  
With such an analysis, the tradeoffs on government costs, maintaining the financial integrity 
of agriculture and program simplicity will become more apparent. 
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Descriptions of Crop Insurance Programs 
 
  The Risk Management Agency (RMA) is presently underwriting four crop insurance programs 
under the authority of the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation (FCIC):  Catastrophic (CAT), Multi-
Peril (MPCI), Income Protection (IP) and Crop Revenue Coverage (CRC).  RMA has also approved 
a Crop Revenue Assurance Program (RA). 
The FCIC Program: 
  The FCIC program is currently a public/private partnership that provides American farmers 
with protection against crop losses.  The Federal government subsidizes the farmers' premiums and 
pays all the delivery and loss adjustment costs. 
  Private companies, through a nationwide network of over 26,000 local insurance agents, sell, 
service and adjust claims on the policies, and at times, share in the risk of certain losses. 
Program Scope: 
  Policies are available on some 85 different crops that account for 80 percent of the value of 
national crop production.  In 1998, there were 1.24 million policies with premiums on the books.  
Farmers paid $931 million out of their own pockets for $27.9 billion in liability protection.  In 
1998, the Government's contribution for premiums was $946 million.  The total (farmer paid + 
Government subsidies) was $1.877 billion.  The Government pays approximately 50.4 percent of 
the farmers' crop insurance premium.  $1,676 billion was paid for crop losses.  Approximately $452 
million went to reimburse the private insurance companies for administrative and delivery 
expenses, including agent commissions. 
  The following is a brief description of crop insurance products that are now offered by FCIC. 
CAT Program: 
  The CAT program is a catastrophic crop disaster program that is designed to be a safety net for 
those producers who do not have other crop insurance coverage.  This program was designed to   40
take the place of the ad-hoc disaster programs of the past.  Producers paid a $60 per crop fee for 
indemnity coverage on production losses over 50%.  To calculate the indemnity payment -- 
production losses of greater than 50% are multiplied by 55% of the crop market price.  Eighty-five 
crops are eligible for this coverage. 
  Ad-hoc disaster programs used the same criteria with two important exemptions -- the disaster 
program was capped at $100,000 and only producers with incomes of under $2 million were 
eligible to participate.  CAT has no cap or income eligibility requirements are required. 
  CAT was designed to be offered for all insured crops and created a Non-Insured Assistance 
program to cover the crops that were not insurable.  This program was designed to take the place of 
the ad-hoc disaster programs and create a safety net for producers.  It is available only from private 
insurance providers.   
  RMA has allowed private companies in 14 states to sell CAT policies.  In 1998, all states will 
be added to this list.  CAT insurance is 100% funded by the USDA. 
  FCIC pays an allowance to providers for loss adjustment expenses, but pays no sales 
commissions for CAT.  Providers may elect to pass a portion of the allowance to agents to 
encourage sales of CAT. 
Multi-Peril Crop Insurance (MPCI): 
  MPCI is the basic insurance plan that USDA has offered for decades.  The premium covers 
only the loss of production.  A producer, generally, can choose to cover production losses from 50% 
to 75% of the crop's production average set for the producer by FCIC.  However, coverage up to 85 
percent is authorized and is offered for several crops.  The indemnity is paid in cash and calculated 
by multiplying the insured production loss by a standard price for the crop that is set by the FCIC. 
 
   41
Income Protection Program: 
  The 1994 Crop Insurance Reform Act mandated that the FCIC develop a program that would  
take into account the market fluctuations as well as production losses of the crop.  In 1996, FCIC 
introduced IP as a pilot program that would assure a fixed price for the commodity as well as up to 
75 percent of the average production.  However, IP can be offered at levels up to 85 percent, but 
FCIC has not chosen to do so.  FCIC sets a price on the commodity about 2 weeks prior to closing 
date (which varies from January 31 to March 15 for spring planted crops), and multiplies the price 
times 60 percent to 75 percent of the average production. 
Crop Revenue Coverage Program (CRC): 
  CRC was first offered in 1996 on a pilot basis by a private crop insurance company called 
American Agrinsurance (AmA).  AmA found that farmers would pay more for a program that truly 
covered their risk.  CRC covers production up to 85 percent and also guarantees a realistic price for 
the production loss.  The production loss is calculated as the guaranteed yield minus the actual yield 
per acre.  Prices loss is determined using commodity futures for various delivery months on several 
different exchanges depending on the crop and state.  CRC now covers 100 percent of the price 
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Indiana   
  Facilitator  
    Mr. Steve Nichols - Carroll County Agricultural Extension Agent 
  Panel Participants  
  Mr.  Rick  Brown     
Mr. Brad Burton 
Mr. Richard Skiles     
Mr. Allen Stout 
Mr. Levi Huffman 
Mr. Fred Wise 
Mr. Jim Yost 
 
Iowa 
  Facilitators  
    Mr. Jim Patton - Webster County Extension Agent   
  Panel Participants  
  Mr.  Phil  Naeve 
Mr. Larry Lynch 
Mr. Don Sandell 
Mr. Bob Anderson 
Mr. Larry Lane 
Mr. Perry Black 
Mr. Britt Shelton 
Mr. Loren Wuebker 
Mr. Dennis Ammen 
Mr. John Ricke 
Mr. Virgil Gordon 
Mr. Merv Berg 
Mr. and Mrs. Jim Carver 
 
Texas - Northern High Plains   
  Facilitators  
    Mr. Robert Harris - Moore County Agricultural Extension Agent 
Dr. Steve Amosson - Extension Economist - Management, Texas A&M University 
  Panel Participants  
  Mr.  Ellis  Moore 
Mr. Tom Moore 
Mr. Brent Clark 
Mr. Kelly Hays 
Mr. Jerry Trussell 
 
Mr. Kelly Williams 
Mr. Kerri Cartwright 
Mr. Rick May 
Mr. Clyde Tims 
North Dakota   
  Facilitators  
    Mr. Shawn Vachal - Barnes County Extension Agent 
Mr. Dwight Aakre - Extension Associate - Farm Management, North Dakota State University 
  Panel Participants  
  Mr.  Mike  Clemens 
Mr. Arvid Winkler 
Mr. Wade Bruns 
Mr. Jack Formo 
Mr. Jim Broten 
 
Mr. Ray Haugen 
Mr. Anthony Thilmony 
Mr. Leland Guscette 
Mr. Greg Shanenko 
Mr. Charles Triebold   44
 
South Central Kansas   
  Facilitators  
    Mr. Fred Delano-Farm Management Program, Kansas State University 
Mr. Gerald Le Valley - Sumner County Agricultural Extension Agent 
Mr. Brad Goehring - Sedgwick County Extension Agent 
Mr. Steve Westfahl - Sedgwick County Extension Agent 
  Panel Participants  
  Mr.  Robert  White 
Mr. Nick Steffen 
Mr. Donald Applegate 
Mr. Robert Headley 
Mr. Dennis Pettigrew 
Mr. Joe Allen 
Mr. Tim Turek 
Mr. David Messenger 
Mr. Rae Reusser 
Mr. Jim Stuhlsatz 
 
Texas - Southern High Plains   
  Facilitators  
    Mr. John Farris - Dawson County Agricultural Extension Agent 
Dr. Jackie Smith - Extension Economist - Management, Texas A&M University 
  Panel Participants  
  Mr.  Milton  Schneider 
Mr. Dave Nix 
Mr. Glen Phipps 
Mr. Donald Vogler 
Mr. Kent Nix 
Mr. Mark Furlow 
Mr. Mark Boardman 
Mr. Lonny Ferguson 
Mr. Todd Gregory 
Mr. Thomas Holder 
Mr. Brad Boyd 
Mr. Jerry Chapman 
 
Texas - Rolling Plains   
  Facilitators  
    Mr. Todd Vineyard - Ellis County Agricultural Extension Agent 
Mr. Stan Bevers - Extension Economist - Management, Texas A&M University 
  Panel Participants  
  Mr.  Ronnie  Richmond 
Mr. Dennis Olson 
Mr. Ronnie Riddle 
Mr. Ferdie Walker 
 
Texas - Central   
  Facilitator  
    Mr. Joe Pope - Erath County Agricultural Extension Agent 
  Panel Participants  
  Mr.  Lane  Jones     
Mr. Leonard Moncrief 
Mr. Jake Van Vliet 
Mr. Lonnie Hammonds 
Mr. Jack Parks 
Mr. Owen Sieperda 























Summary of Simulation Results for 
Selected Representative Farms Appendix III  Table  1.  Summary of Alternative Farm Safety Net Options for IAG2400
A70 A90 B70 B90 C70 C90 CAT MPCI NOINS
Safety Net and Indemnity Payments ($1,000)
Mean 0.94 13.17 3.28 20.39 3.27 22.40 0.95 4.90 0.00
Std Dev 6.79 34.68 14.91 44.56 14.93 45.83 2.23 8.93 0.00
Coef Var (%) 720.71 263.40 454.88 218.49 456.73 204.57 234.81 182.21 0.00
Minimum 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Maximum 105.26 233.20 143.93 254.96 144.45 259.54 19.99 72.31 0.00
Mean/Theoritical Max (%) 0.90 5.65 2.28 8.00 2.26 8.63 4.76 6.78 0.00
P(Indemnity) (%) 3.09 20.26 7.52 25.83 7.52 28.26 26.37 47.15 0.00
CDF @  1%  (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
CDF @  5%  (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
CDF @ 10%  (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
CDF @ 15%  (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
CDF @ 20%  (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
CDF @ 25%  (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
CDF @ 30%  (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
CDF @ 35%  (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
CDF @ 40%  (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
CDF @ 45%  (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
CDF @ 50%  (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
CDF @ 55%  (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.0
CDF @ 60%  (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.5 0.0
CDF @ 65%  (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.7 0.0
CDF @ 70%  (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.0 0.0
CDF @ 75%  (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.4 0.0 17.8 0.3 5.9 0.0
CDF @ 80%  (%) 0.0 1.0 0.0 31.9 0.0 44.0 1.0 8.6 0.0
CDF @ 85%  (%) 0.0 24.1 0.0 58.3 0.0 65.8 2.1 12.8 0.0
CDF @ 90%  (%) 0.0 54.8 0.0 84.2 0.0 89.1 4.3 16.3 0.0
CDF @ 95%  (%) 0.0 97.5 22.5 128.9 22.3 131.2 6.2 24.6 0.0
CDF @ 99%  (%) 35.9 162.9 87.2 193.3 87.4 194.2 9.7 41.0 0.0
Total Receipts ($1,000)
Mean 639.33 651.55 641.66 658.78 641.65 660.79 639.34 643.28 638.38
Std Dev 113.38 98.06 110.59 99.65 110.57 98.09 114.62 111.01 115.31
Coef Var (%) 17.74 15.05 17.23 15.13 17.23 14.84 17.93 17.26 18.06
Minimum 359.01 443.78 333.01 391.25 333.01 405.82 326.60 365.16 322.63
Maximum 1067.20 1067.20 1067.20 1067.20 1067.20 1067.20 1067.20 1067.20 1067.20
Net Cash Income ($1,000)
Mean 188.48 204.57 191.43 211.81 191.54 214.52 188.34 193.55 187.12
Std Dev 114.06 99.23 111.17 100.72 111.12 98.98 115.29 111.62 116.00
Minimum -102.56 -26.05 -129.16 -56.23 -129.16 -48.75 -126.42 -93.62 -129.16
Maximum 620.57 620.57 620.57 620.57 620.57 620.57 620.57 620.67 620.57
CDF @ Minimum -102.56 -26.05 -129.16 -56.23 -129.16 -48.75 -126.42 -93.62 -129.16
CDF @  1%  (%) -55.17 27.44 -47.66 -6.43 -46.92 3.95 -71.30 -44.29 -77.07
CDF @  5%  (%) -0.82 66.13 16.38 55.25 16.75 59.17 -4.97 12.57 -8.81
CDF @ 10%  (%) 43.47 87.67 51.37 89.70 51.58 94.30 44.11 54.77 41.73
CDF @ 15%  (%) 75.56 108.35 79.80 114.63 79.96 118.22 76.32 84.12 74.87
CDF @ 20%  (%) 99.45 123.09 102.36 131.09 102.52 135.19 100.41 105.60 98.93
CDF @ 25%  (%) 116.89 134.72 121.21 142.97 121.32 146.78 117.26 122.29 116.16
CDF @ 30%  (%) 131.61 144.57 135.54 154.36 135.60 158.93 131.70 135.01 130.90
CDF @ 35%  (%) 142.71 154.84 146.35 166.47 146.56 170.37 142.88 146.57 142.11
CDF @ 40%  (%) 154.89 164.74 158.28 179.06 158.39 182.97 155.04 158.42 154.37
CDF @ 45%  (%) 167.07 175.94 169.10 191.11 169.02 194.75 167.26 170.72 166.41
CDF @ 50%  (%) 180.66 187.36 181.80 204.52 181.95 207.76 181.15 183.97 180.33
CDF @ 55%  (%) 194.42 200.72 195.38 220.00 195.50 221.99 194.92 198.00 193.78
CDF @ 60%  (%) 210.66 217.00 211.22 235.08 211.27 236.49 211.08 214.13 210.27
CDF @ 65%  (%) 227.22 234.49 227.83 248.43 227.97 249.88 227.22 229.96 226.72
CDF @ 70%  (%) 243.54 248.92 244.03 260.33 244.09 261.25 243.73 246.54 243.05
CDF @ 75%  (%) 261.31 265.99 261.55 274.32 261.55 275.19 261.76 264.84 260.93
CDF @ 80%  (%) 281.51 285.11 281.54 291.82 281.76 292.09 282.10 285.19 280.91
CDF @ 85%  (%) 305.98 309.26 306.19 310.61 306.28 310.98 306.95 310.34 305.77
CDF @ 90%  (%) 338.29 341.40 338.65 340.64 338.69 341.01 338.99 341.54 338.04
CDF @ 95%  (%) 380.87 383.65 381.43 384.26 381.43 384.77 381.12 383.14 380.87
CDF @ 99%  (%) 483.87 486.21 484.09 486.36 484.40 486.36 484.14 485.38 483.87
CDF @ Maximum 620.57 620.57 620.57 620.57 620.57 620.57 620.57 620.67 620.57
Probability of Negative Net Cash Farm Income
Mean 5.07 0.31 3.57 1.24 3.55 0.85 5.39 3.95 5.62
Probability of Cash Flow Deficit
Mean 38.18 33.38 36.49 28.43 36.47 26.73 37.95 36.67 38.33
Probability of Losing Real Net Worth
Mean 21.23 9.35 18.47 10.67 18.13 9.37 21.71 17.84 22.54Appendix III  Table  2.  Summary of Alternative Farm Safety Net Options for TXNP6700
A70 A90 B70 B90 C70 C90 CAT MPCI NOINS
Safety Net and Indemnity Payments ($1,000)
Mean 1.54 28.71 13.63 67.54 51.53 116.43 12.63 33.62 0.00
Std Dev 16.66 82.11 50.50 145.68 89.72 185.75 22.23 55.26 0.00
Coef Var (%) 1082.59 286.01 370.44 215.68 174.10 159.53 176.03 164.38 0.00
Minimum 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Maximum 548.45 938.02 575.03 940.56 993.66 1348.49 186.18 466.55 0.00
Mean/Theoritical Max (%) 0.28 3.06 2.37 7.18 5.19 8.63 6.78 7.21 0.00
P(Indemnity) (%) 1.52 19.40 10.33 26.50 75.50 80.30 64.63 73.28 0.00
CDF @  1%  (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
CDF @  5%  (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
CDF @ 10%  (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
CDF @ 15%  (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
CDF @ 20%  (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0
CDF @ 25%  (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 3.2 0.0 0.0 0.0
CDF @ 30%  (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.7 5.7 0.0 1.3 0.0
CDF @ 35%  (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.7 11.5 0.0 3.4 0.0
CDF @ 40%  (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.5 21.5 1.2 5.5 0.0
CDF @ 45%  (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 14.6 28.4 1.8 9.5 0.0
CDF @ 50%  (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 23.3 34.2 3.6 15.9 0.0
CDF @ 55%  (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 28.5 39.4 7.6 23.2 0.0
CDF @ 60%  (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 33.6 46.0 10.7 27.9 0.0
CDF @ 65%  (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 38.1 60.1 12.2 32.3 0.0
CDF @ 70%  (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 42.7 78.1 14.1 36.6 0.0
CDF @ 75%  (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 22.0 52.1 128.1 16.1 40.7 0.0
CDF @ 80%  (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 93.9 66.7 211.4 18.1 47.4 0.0
CDF @ 85%  (%) 0.0 45.9 0.0 187.4 83.9 300.2 23.3 59.9 0.0
CDF @ 90%  (%) 0.0 107.3 5.8 310.4 144.3 401.7 28.8 74.4 0.0
CDF @ 95%  (%) 0.0 203.4 117.0 425.9 249.1 547.0 45.4 134.3 0.0
CDF @ 99%  (%) 50.3 408.9 276.5 611.3 428.3 773.7 113.6 275.9 0.0
Total Receipts ($1,000)
Mean 1816.89 1844.06 1828.98 1882.89 1866.89 1931.79 1827.97 1848.97 1815.35
Std Dev 332.30 304.95 321.32 290.19 302.82 272.70 327.69 317.88 335.04
Coef Var (%) 18.29 16.54 17.57 15.41 16.22 14.12 17.93 17.19 18.46
Minimum 953.21 1200.09 953.21 995.52 1111.78 1184.68 960.97 1111.78 807.95
Maximum 3119.55 3119.55 3119.55 3119.55 3119.55 3119.55 3119.55 3119.55 3119.55
Net Cash Income ($1,000)
Mean 385.24 417.18 399.32 459.54 406.89 479.21 397.94 422.13 383.37
Std Dev 335.14 308.77 324.15 294.25 305.48 276.25 330.21 320.20 337.71
Minimum -642.27 -350.88 -627.74 -489.32 -455.20 -287.89 -603.11 -441.11 -651.86
Maximum 1674.93 1690.96 1674.04 1686.62 1657.60 1664.93 1681.74 1692.43 1674.04
CDF @ Minimum -642.27 -350.88 -627.74 -489.32 -455.20 -287.89 -603.11 -441.11 -651.86
CDF @  1%  (%) -262.14 -95.03 -168.99 -88.25 -94.95 -25.95 -208.22 -125.27 -282.55
CDF @  5%  (%) -60.12 37.90 -36.42 81.59 38.55 130.92 -34.89 14.63 -75.06
CDF @ 10%  (%) 16.66 102.57 48.40 149.78 94.91 185.87 41.24 79.71 15.08
CDF @ 15%  (%) 72.77 137.66 105.80 191.42 129.95 221.86 89.64 123.91 71.97
CDF @ 20%  (%) 116.67 166.16 144.60 225.28 158.75 253.40 130.02 157.32 116.64
CDF @ 25%  (%) 151.97 192.02 174.93 256.73 185.72 284.65 162.33 187.16 151.79
CDF @ 30%  (%) 182.88 216.83 205.82 286.58 211.73 315.24 194.05 216.84 182.70
CDF @ 35%  (%) 215.80 243.52 233.85 316.52 239.99 347.29 224.31 246.03 215.14
CDF @ 40%  (%) 248.44 278.24 266.63 347.90 269.98 379.81 259.20 280.19 247.49
CDF @ 45%  (%) 286.95 313.64 301.01 380.77 302.19 409.59 296.92 319.08 286.83
CDF @ 50%  (%) 326.87 351.85 338.61 410.18 338.05 437.53 338.48 360.72 326.65
CDF @ 55%  (%) 372.11 392.69 380.27 442.78 378.82 467.28 382.66 403.23 371.86
CDF @ 60%  (%) 415.36 430.49 420.89 474.43 417.85 494.75 425.99 445.67 414.69
CDF @ 65%  (%) 461.26 470.25 463.53 509.80 458.85 524.72 470.11 488.12 460.65
CDF @ 70%  (%) 508.92 515.36 510.13 551.76 503.57 561.35 518.89 536.47 508.82
CDF @ 75%  (%) 569.13 572.24 569.46 598.86 561.33 606.02 577.13 595.62 568.68
CDF @ 80%  (%) 642.93 645.76 643.21 665.79 632.14 665.49 652.45 665.74 642.51
CDF @ 85%  (%) 737.57 740.46 738.90 751.73 724.21 745.64 745.68 757.97 737.19
CDF @ 90%  (%) 855.12 861.28 857.66 867.22 845.37 858.06 865.74 879.93 855.01
CDF @ 95%  (%) 1047.83 1053.49 1050.76 1061.73 1037.49 1046.95 1055.13 1070.71 1047.26
CDF @ 99%  (%) 1317.50 1318.87 1319.39 1328.43 1293.66 1298.71 1318.28 1328.62 1317.50
CDF @ Maximum 1674.93 1690.96 1674.04 1686.62 1657.60 1664.93 1681.74 1692.43 1674.04
Probability of Negative Net Cash Farm Income
Mean 8.78 3.05 6.90 2.31 3.24 1.16 6.92 4.14 9.01
Probability of Cash Flow Deficit
Mean 49.09 46.10 47.74 35.76 47.83 31.42 47.88 45.20 49.20
Probability of Losing Real Net Worth
Mean 26.22 19.52 23.68 14.13 20.14 9.56 23.59 18.37 26.52Appendix III  Table  3.  Summary of Alternative Farm Safety Net Options for NDW4850
A70 A90 B70 B90 C70 C90 CAT MPCI NOINS
Safety Net and Indemnity Payments ($1,000)
Mean 0.41 16.74 1.10 17.08 1.43 20.04 5.32 20.96 0.00
Std Dev 5.00 39.24 8.52 41.77 9.43 42.98 7.76 23.78 0.00
Coef Var (%) 1222.71 234.35 773.88 244.48 659.10 214.44 145.68 113.43 0.00
Minimum 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Maximum 155.30 335.63 173.15 331.58 165.81 324.09 55.36 153.25 0.00
Mean/Theoritical Max (%) 0.26 4.99 0.64 5.15 0.86 6.19 9.62 13.68 0.00
P(Indemnity) (%) 1.15 24.80 2.85 22.76 3.74 27.53 57.92 76.18 0.00
CDF @  1%  (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
CDF @  5%  (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
CDF @ 10%  (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
CDF @ 15%  (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
CDF @ 20%  (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
CDF @ 25%  (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.0
CDF @ 30%  (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.8 0.0
CDF @ 35%  (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.1 0.0
CDF @ 40%  (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.5 0.0
CDF @ 45%  (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.7 9.8 0.0
CDF @ 50%  (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.6 12.8 0.0
CDF @ 55%  (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.7 16.3 0.0
CDF @ 60%  (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.0 19.9 0.0
CDF @ 65%  (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.2 23.8 0.0
CDF @ 70%  (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.5 28.2 0.0
CDF @ 75%  (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 11.1 8.1 33.3 0.0
CDF @ 80%  (%) 0.0 21.0 0.0 12.3 0.0 33.3 10.3 37.9 0.0
CDF @ 85%  (%) 0.0 42.0 0.0 41.4 0.0 56.1 12.1 45.2 0.0
CDF @ 90%  (%) 0.0 69.7 0.0 73.9 0.0 83.5 15.5 55.1 0.0
CDF @ 95%  (%) 0.0 109.2 0.0 115.6 0.0 119.1 22.2 70.4 0.0
CDF @ 99%  (%) 5.5 178.4 41.0 190.7 49.9 187.9 33.2 97.4 0.0
Total Receipts ($1,000)
Mean 779.02 795.36 779.71 795.70 780.04 798.66 783.94 799.57 778.61
Std Dev 159.09 144.08 158.25 145.65 157.91 143.18 158.07 154.49 159.73
Coef Var (%) 20.42 18.11 20.30 18.30 20.24 17.93 20.16 19.32 20.51
Minimum 413.62 562.71 403.36 476.49 391.72 491.45 392.67 456.97 365.05
Maximum 1571.70 1571.70 1571.70 1571.70 1571.70 1571.70 1571.70 1571.70 1571.70
Net Cash Income ($1,000)
Mean 241.45 261.22 242.20 260.45 242.45 263.34 246.51 263.64 240.62
Std Dev 160.55 145.07 159.73 147.06 159.44 144.62 159.60 155.82 161.33
Minimum -146.95 11.66 -153.69 -81.91 -157.48 -57.71 -154.63 -115.73 -199.96
Maximum 1040.66 1040.66 1040.66 1040.66 1040.66 1040.66 1040.66 1040.66 1040.66
CDF @ Minimum -146.95 11.66 -153.69 -81.91 -157.48 -57.71 -154.63 -115.73 -199.96
CDF @  1%  (%) -30.00 51.34 -26.19 16.07 -24.25 33.87 -25.25 9.63 -42.05
CDF @  5%  (%) 26.81 84.93 31.41 71.91 32.38 82.10 33.05 58.56 24.15
CDF @ 10%  (%) 62.18 107.90 65.21 103.44 66.54 111.98 68.39 88.53 59.84
CDF @ 15%  (%) 85.59 125.86 87.81 125.19 88.33 129.96 92.37 112.38 84.84
CDF @ 20%  (%) 107.18 140.45 108.80 141.61 108.95 145.56 112.66 131.03 106.56
CDF @ 25%  (%) 125.37 154.47 125.96 156.36 126.49 159.50 131.00 147.92 125.01
CDF @ 30%  (%) 141.62 168.46 142.04 170.07 142.18 173.31 146.84 164.25 141.05
CDF @ 35%  (%) 157.63 180.75 158.00 183.49 158.29 186.52 163.25 179.67 157.15
CDF @ 40%  (%) 174.33 194.94 174.68 197.13 174.78 200.11 179.59 196.22 174.01
CDF @ 45%  (%) 191.07 208.80 191.28 210.81 191.26 213.60 196.44 215.04 190.65
CDF @ 50%  (%) 209.44 224.87 209.61 226.67 209.61 229.12 215.31 232.92 209.08
CDF @ 55%  (%) 230.24 240.97 230.26 244.28 230.26 245.49 235.47 252.18 229.87
CDF @ 60%  (%) 250.66 258.74 250.81 262.60 250.54 263.62 255.68 274.93 250.40
CDF @ 65%  (%) 277.53 282.85 277.61 285.39 277.50 286.21 282.02 299.25 277.17
CDF @ 70%  (%) 305.53 309.31 305.59 310.24 305.51 311.68 310.80 326.76 305.28
CDF @ 75%  (%) 338.07 340.55 338.55 341.12 338.23 342.13 343.05 357.44 337.79
CDF @ 80%  (%) 374.78 378.00 375.03 377.02 374.78 377.50 379.99 394.39 374.78
CDF @ 85%  (%) 419.99 422.71 420.04 421.91 420.04 421.88 423.56 438.35 419.60
CDF @ 90%  (%) 471.78 476.06 471.78 474.29 471.79 473.87 476.12 486.27 471.78
CDF @ 95%  (%) 545.56 547.12 545.56 546.92 545.58 546.28 549.70 559.78 545.38
CDF @ 99%  (%) 680.56 681.26 680.56 680.56 680.56 680.56 683.22 689.84 680.36
CDF @ Maximum 1040.66 1040.66 1040.66 1040.66 1040.66 1040.66 1040.66 1040.66 1040.66
Probability of Negative Net Cash Farm Income
Mean 2.39 0.00 2.13 0.55 1.97 0.33 1.96 0.74 2.69
Probability of Cash Flow Deficit
Mean 50.89 49.19 50.87 47.66 50.86 47.25 49.99 45.70 50.98
Probability of Losing Real Net Worth
Mean 36.12 19.56 35.88 25.21 36.17 25.21 34.77 26.37 37.48Appendix III  Table  4.  Summary of Alternative Farm Safety Net Options for KSSW3180
A70 A90 B70 B90 C70 C90 CAT MPCI NOINS
Safety Net and Indemnity Payments ($1,000)
Mean 3.63 21.42 5.49 21.29 4.87 21.96 5.43 18.03 0.00
Std Dev 15.50 41.93 19.84 43.04 18.41 42.90 8.00 22.62 0.00
Coef Var (%) 426.83 195.77 361.55 202.21 378.18 195.37 147.33 125.46 0.00
Minimum 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Maximum 181.62 305.12 217.44 318.01 207.28 314.42 60.27 153.08 0.00
Mean/Theoritical Max (%) 2.00 7.02 2.52 6.69 2.35 6.98 9.00 11.78 0.00
P(Indemnity) (%) 8.86 34.03 12.34 32.59 11.37 33.90 76.19 86.20 0.00
CDF @  1%  (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
CDF @  5%  (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
CDF @ 10%  (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
CDF @ 15%  (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0
CDF @ 20%  (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.0
CDF @ 25%  (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 1.3 0.0
CDF @ 30%  (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 2.0 0.0
CDF @ 35%  (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 3.0 0.0
CDF @ 40%  (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.7 4.5 0.0
CDF @ 45%  (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 6.3 0.0
CDF @ 50%  (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.4 8.3 0.0
CDF @ 55%  (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.1 10.8 0.0
CDF @ 60%  (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.0 13.8 0.0
CDF @ 65%  (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.3 17.8 0.0
CDF @ 70%  (%) 0.0 10.3 0.0 7.5 0.0 11.1 5.7 22.7 0.0
CDF @ 75%  (%) 0.0 24.5 0.0 22.0 0.0 25.0 8.0 28.5 0.0
CDF @ 80%  (%) 0.0 40.7 0.0 38.1 0.0 41.7 11.0 34.7 0.0
CDF @ 85%  (%) 0.0 59.4 0.0 58.2 0.0 61.0 13.8 40.6 0.0
CDF @ 90%  (%) 0.0 81.5 11.0 82.7 6.8 83.9 16.6 49.3 0.0
CDF @ 95%  (%) 27.2 119.0 42.9 118.0 37.7 116.8 22.4 66.5 0.0
CDF @ 99%  (%) 88.0 183.8 103.7 189.3 97.3 185.8 34.5 95.8 0.0
Total Receipts ($1,000)
Mean 412.14 429.92 413.99 429.79 413.37 430.46 413.93 426.54 408.50
Std Dev 101.97 87.66 100.72 90.99 101.31 90.24 102.88 95.32 106.87
Coef Var (%) 24.74 20.39 24.33 21.17 24.51 20.96 24.86 22.35 26.16
Minimum 204.61 273.56 197.63 225.89 193.34 239.11 186.66 235.58 142.70
Maximum 943.61 943.61 943.61 943.61 943.61 943.61 943.61 943.61 943.61
Net Cash Income ($1,000)
Mean 185.20 202.99 187.06 202.86 186.44 203.53 187.00 199.60 181.57
Std Dev 102.01 87.68 100.75 91.01 101.34 90.26 102.91 95.34 106.90
Minimum -23.86 45.09 -29.17 -1.25 -33.47 11.96 -41.81 8.52 -85.77
Maximum 716.43 716.43 716.43 716.43 716.43 716.43 716.43 716.43 716.43
CDF @ Minimum -23.86 45.09 -29.17 -1.25 -33.47 11.96 -41.81 8.52 -85.77
CDF @  1%  (%) 14.60 77.62 11.60 49.79 9.74 54.02 1.60 45.72 -25.22
CDF @  5%  (%) 45.03 96.97 48.42 80.08 46.29 82.05 39.40 73.81 22.36
CDF @ 10%  (%) 65.12 111.48 70.17 100.78 68.00 102.74 65.48 92.67 54.23
CDF @ 15%  (%) 81.81 121.62 88.02 116.20 86.47 117.56 85.11 106.87 74.90
CDF @ 20%  (%) 97.43 131.63 102.84 128.87 101.56 129.95 101.49 119.19 93.45
CDF @ 25%  (%) 111.11 139.74 115.92 139.09 115.11 140.09 115.03 130.85 108.53
CDF @ 30%  (%) 124.56 147.62 128.31 148.83 127.34 150.35 127.98 141.45 122.57
CDF @ 35%  (%) 136.34 155.70 139.43 158.80 139.12 160.46 139.76 151.57 135.11
CDF @ 40%  (%) 147.05 164.83 149.86 168.65 149.23 169.59 150.88 161.58 146.52
CDF @ 45%  (%) 158.46 173.37 161.27 178.33 160.88 179.05 162.03 171.92 158.28
CDF @ 50%  (%) 170.49 182.58 172.06 188.93 171.78 189.19 173.53 182.89 170.23
CDF @ 55%  (%) 182.65 193.40 183.98 198.96 183.66 198.98 185.87 194.30 182.47
CDF @ 60%  (%) 196.13 204.29 196.77 210.02 196.48 209.90 198.47 206.35 195.96
CDF @ 65%  (%) 209.58 216.64 209.91 222.24 209.68 221.55 212.07 219.62 209.51
CDF @ 70%  (%) 226.15 231.80 226.29 235.78 226.29 235.10 228.60 235.11 226.15
CDF @ 75%  (%) 243.94 247.10 243.94 250.46 243.94 249.78 246.60 252.46 243.94
CDF @ 80%  (%) 263.06 264.92 263.06 267.82 263.06 267.63 265.72 271.93 263.06
CDF @ 85%  (%) 289.14 289.81 289.14 291.35 289.14 290.98 291.03 296.48 289.14
CDF @ 90%  (%) 322.73 323.17 322.73 323.62 322.73 323.60 324.75 329.27 322.73
CDF @ 95%  (%) 377.18 377.18 377.18 377.18 377.18 377.18 379.24 382.60 377.18
CDF @ 99%  (%) 477.85 477.85 477.85 477.85 477.85 477.85 477.85 481.06 477.85
CDF @ Maximum 716.43 716.43 716.43 716.43 716.43 716.43 716.43 716.43 716.43
Probability of Negative Net Cash Farm Income
Mean 0.22 0.00 0.44 0.01 0.49 0.00 0.93 0.00 2.53
Probability of Cash Flow Deficit
Mean 48.91 42.69 48.21 40.00 48.35 39.55 47.69 43.54 48.75
Probability of Losing Real Net Worth
Mean 1.10 1.00 1.18 1.00 1.15 1.00 1.07 1.00 1.29Appendix III  Table  5.  Summary of Alternative Farm Safety Net Options for TXSP3697
A70 A90 B70 B90 C70 C90 CAT MPCI NOINS
Safety Net and Indemnity Payments ($1,000)
Mean 9.09 53.93 7.04 34.19 7.01 35.64 15.74 47.32 0.00
Std Dev 36.92 101.67 31.81 81.61 30.72 80.31 18.96 52.04 0.00
Coef Var (%) 406.08 188.50 452.00 238.71 438.20 225.37 120.46 109.96 0.00
Minimum 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Maximum 417.55 670.56 428.15 660.71 395.20 615.62 122.08 316.36 0.00
Mean/Theoritical Max (%) 2.18 8.04 1.64 5.18 1.77 5.79 12.89 14.96 0.00
P(Indemnity) (%) 9.81 34.33 7.82 24.82 8.36 27.06 59.99 71.59 0.00
CDF @  1%  (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
CDF @  5%  (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
CDF @ 10%  (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
CDF @ 15%  (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
CDF @ 20%  (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
CDF @ 25%  (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
CDF @ 30%  (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 0.0
CDF @ 35%  (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.9 0.0
CDF @ 40%  (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 14.5 0.0
CDF @ 45%  (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.0 24.7 0.0
CDF @ 50%  (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.0 33.3 0.0
CDF @ 55%  (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 13.1 40.4 0.0
CDF @ 60%  (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 15.8 47.2 0.0
CDF @ 65%  (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 18.3 56.0 0.0
CDF @ 70%  (%) 0.0 30.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 21.4 67.7 0.0
CDF @ 75%  (%) 0.0 68.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 13.0 26.6 78.9 0.0
CDF @ 80%  (%) 0.0 108.4 0.0 36.3 0.0 49.4 31.5 92.0 0.0
CDF @ 85%  (%) 0.0 155.1 0.0 84.0 0.0 94.7 37.3 107.0 0.0
CDF @ 90%  (%) 0.0 209.0 0.0 139.6 0.0 146.8 44.1 124.0 0.0
CDF @ 95%  (%) 70.9 282.5 49.7 223.4 51.6 222.4 52.7 148.2 0.0
CDF @ 99%  (%) 206.9 431.7 182.1 385.8 173.2 368.2 72.7 198.5 0.0
Total Receipts ($1,000)
Mean 972.98 1017.81 970.92 998.07 970.89 999.52 979.62 1011.21 963.88
Std Dev 235.03 195.63 238.04 215.10 237.97 212.71 235.10 214.83 246.98
Coef Var (%) 24.16 19.22 24.52 21.55 24.51 21.28 24.00 21.25 25.62
Minimum 463.55 664.27 405.36 452.39 412.28 536.85 343.55 476.11 265.87
Maximum 1850.57 1850.57 1850.57 1850.57 1850.57 1850.57 1850.57 1850.57 1850.57
Net Cash Income ($1,000)
Mean 266.42 318.59 262.78 292.88 263.15 295.93 273.35 310.11 254.85
Std Dev 190.68 157.45 193.83 175.62 193.58 172.43 190.49 172.30 201.65
Minimum -170.11 -5.27 -218.33 -194.88 -211.58 -88.50 -233.54 -163.75 -304.80
Maximum 998.37 1007.96 998.37 1004.02 998.37 1003.94 1000.56 1004.94 998.37
CDF @ Minimum -170.11 -5.27 -218.33 -194.88 -211.58 -88.50 -233.54 -163.75 -304.80
CDF @  1%  (%) -63.95 63.98 -91.81 -24.14 -89.13 -5.26 -77.34 2.22 -121.96
CDF @  5%  (%) -2.04 109.78 -14.48 43.87 -13.72 58.96 -0.76 69.61 -41.51
CDF @ 10%  (%) 43.27 143.50 33.84 86.67 34.44 95.81 46.47 109.37 9.41
CDF @ 15%  (%) 70.51 166.84 62.97 116.23 64.25 121.80 77.64 135.17 44.65
CDF @ 20%  (%) 95.92 186.41 89.13 141.67 89.68 145.22 102.68 157.41 74.71
CDF @ 25%  (%) 118.96 203.96 114.02 164.38 114.28 166.75 126.76 178.08 101.49
CDF @ 30%  (%) 142.08 219.00 140.14 185.88 140.25 188.79 153.59 199.29 128.71
CDF @ 35%  (%) 166.66 234.67 165.92 205.80 165.49 207.17 178.72 220.92 155.45
CDF @ 40%  (%) 191.56 251.56 190.27 223.51 190.45 225.30 202.15 243.11 183.47
CDF @ 45%  (%) 214.03 268.91 213.05 245.41 212.84 247.12 227.32 266.96 208.53
CDF @ 50%  (%) 239.28 288.34 238.18 270.57 237.78 270.78 251.18 289.44 233.95
CDF @ 55%  (%) 269.67 308.15 267.38 293.09 267.36 294.06 279.35 312.60 265.09
CDF @ 60%  (%) 296.66 330.25 294.98 317.93 294.89 319.04 306.15 337.02 294.33
CDF @ 65%  (%) 326.03 353.59 324.35 345.54 324.83 346.38 335.82 361.71 323.62
CDF @ 70%  (%) 358.13 380.77 357.09 374.74 357.50 374.64 366.47 390.85 356.66
CDF @ 75%  (%) 393.44 412.31 392.29 403.88 392.46 404.47 400.13 420.95 391.09
CDF @ 80%  (%) 429.30 445.48 427.69 437.53 428.07 437.17 434.49 453.09 427.41
CDF @ 85%  (%) 475.96 486.95 475.28 479.57 475.34 479.50 478.70 492.77 474.66
CDF @ 90%  (%) 527.83 535.71 527.04 529.36 527.33 530.01 531.92 543.16 526.36
CDF @ 95%  (%) 608.90 613.95 607.65 609.16 607.94 609.93 610.83 618.85 607.65
CDF @ 99%  (%) 772.35 778.04 772.35 774.17 772.35 775.80 774.84 781.74 772.35
CDF @ Maximum 998.37 1007.96 998.37 1004.02 998.37 1003.94 1000.56 1004.94 998.37
Probability of Negative Net Cash Farm Income
Mean 5.18 0.01 6.28 2.08 6.24 1.07 5.07 0.90 8.99
Probability of Cash Flow Deficit
Mean 38.70 20.25 38.90 30.24 38.90 29.57 36.48 27.08 40.22
Probability of Losing Real Net Worth
Mean 11.99 2.18 14.69 8.98 14.05 6.34 11.41 3.98 16.59Appendix III  Table  6.  Summary of Alternative Farm Safety Net Options for TXRP2500
A70 A90 B70 B90 C70 C90 CAT MPCI NOINS
Safety Net and Indemnity Payments ($1,000)
Mean 5.44 21.39 4.47 13.54 5.20 16.58 5.98 16.60 0.00
Std Dev 15.81 34.69 13.76 26.25 15.24 30.11 5.35 13.41 0.00
Coef Var (%) 290.90 162.15 307.65 193.79 292.98 181.67 89.45 80.77 0.00
Minimum 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Maximum 154.72 227.48 157.86 225.69 163.86 234.02 33.54 82.79 0.00
Mean/Theoritical Max (%) 3.51 9.41 2.83 6.00 3.18 7.08 17.82 20.05 0.00
P(Indemnity) (%) 18.16 41.93 16.09 33.02 17.44 35.98 89.23 95.44 0.00
CDF @  1%  (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
CDF @  5%  (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0
CDF @ 10%  (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.7 0.0
CDF @ 15%  (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 3.2 0.0
CDF @ 20%  (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.2 4.5 0.0
CDF @ 25%  (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.6 5.9 0.0
CDF @ 30%  (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.2 7.5 0.0
CDF @ 35%  (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.9 9.0 0.0
CDF @ 40%  (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.4 10.5 0.0
CDF @ 45%  (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.1 12.1 0.0
CDF @ 50%  (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.8 13.8 0.0
CDF @ 55%  (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.5 15.6 0.0
CDF @ 60%  (%) 0.0 3.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.2 17.6 0.0
CDF @ 65%  (%) 0.0 13.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.9 7.0 19.6 0.0
CDF @ 70%  (%) 0.0 24.6 0.0 6.3 0.0 12.4 7.9 21.7 0.0
CDF @ 75%  (%) 0.0 36.3 0.0 15.9 0.0 23.6 8.9 24.3 0.0
CDF @ 80%  (%) 0.0 48.1 0.0 27.5 0.0 35.7 10.1 27.2 0.0
CDF @ 85%  (%) 6.9 59.5 2.5 37.9 6.0 47.1 11.5 30.4 0.0
CDF @ 90%  (%) 20.2 74.1 15.8 51.4 19.5 61.5 13.4 35.1 0.0
CDF @ 95%  (%) 41.0 96.1 35.1 74.0 39.3 84.0 16.5 42.6 0.0
CDF @ 99%  (%) 77.3 139.1 67.5 108.6 73.2 125.9 22.3 57.1 0.0
Total Receipts ($1,000)
Mean 240.16 256.12 239.20 248.27 239.93 251.30 240.70 251.33 234.72
Std Dev 81.55 70.04 82.47 75.82 81.73 73.58 84.27 79.42 87.55
Coef Var (%) 33.96 27.35 34.48 30.54 34.07 29.28 35.01 31.60 37.30
Minimum 91.45 141.93 79.25 94.47 96.53 112.93 76.30 94.70 57.67
Maximum 600.07 600.07 600.07 600.07 600.07 600.07 600.61 602.98 600.07
Net Cash Income ($1,000)
Mean 25.99 46.13 23.94 34.46 25.16 38.99 26.66 40.93 18.73
Std Dev 71.15 61.38 72.06 66.82 71.34 64.71 73.19 68.39 76.42
Minimum -135.63 -74.26 -141.18 -126.07 -128.37 -97.45 -146.17 -119.23 -162.57
Maximum 338.90 344.02 335.70 341.02 336.49 344.02 337.01 344.18 333.31
CDF @ Minimum -135.63 -74.26 -141.18 -126.07 -128.37 -97.45 -146.17 -119.23 -162.57
CDF @  1%  (%) -95.58 -50.78 -102.25 -85.16 -98.10 -73.57 -101.14 -75.99 -117.95
CDF @  5%  (%) -69.37 -32.74 -74.23 -57.29 -71.42 -47.52 -76.60 -52.63 -91.39
CDF @ 10%  (%) -54.15 -20.90 -57.98 -40.45 -55.21 -32.71 -59.51 -37.28 -72.90
CDF @ 15%  (%) -43.80 -11.92 -46.86 -30.14 -44.52 -23.10 -46.68 -26.56 -58.74
CDF @ 20%  (%) -35.38 -4.26 -38.04 -21.12 -36.00 -14.76 -36.08 -17.69 -47.15
CDF @ 25%  (%) -26.49 1.91 -28.92 -13.42 -27.43 -7.30 -27.34 -9.10 -37.71
CDF @ 30%  (%) -18.09 7.98 -20.42 -5.69 -19.15 -0.47 -17.71 -1.17 -26.96
CDF @ 35%  (%) -10.49 13.84 -12.12 1.92 -11.12 6.43 -8.87 7.01 -17.11
CDF @ 40%  (%) -2.33 20.43 -3.40 9.20 -2.66 13.29 -0.31 14.68 -7.83
CDF @ 45%  (%) 5.67 26.83 4.46 16.75 5.43 20.43 8.71 22.59 1.17
CDF @ 50%  (%) 14.72 33.79 13.01 24.41 13.66 27.78 16.81 30.07 9.74
CDF @ 55%  (%) 23.62 40.78 21.85 32.37 22.86 35.74 25.87 38.82 18.90
CDF @ 60%  (%) 32.72 48.41 31.44 40.66 32.04 44.01 35.67 47.52 29.44
CDF @ 65%  (%) 42.82 57.94 40.95 49.88 41.72 53.76 45.53 57.58 39.71
CDF @ 70%  (%) 53.71 68.03 52.11 59.77 52.77 63.18 56.87 67.90 51.15
CDF @ 75%  (%) 66.48 79.04 64.88 71.05 65.47 74.31 69.69 79.83 63.93
CDF @ 80%  (%) 81.96 92.41 80.72 84.88 81.23 87.79 84.61 94.43 79.64
CDF @ 85%  (%) 100.77 108.89 99.33 102.31 99.92 105.03 102.58 111.58 98.51
CDF @ 90%  (%) 127.19 132.22 125.98 127.53 126.42 129.29 129.82 137.85 125.66
CDF @ 95%  (%) 163.98 167.62 163.25 163.99 163.42 165.44 165.75 173.03 162.65
CDF @ 99%  (%) 226.32 229.82 224.44 226.32 225.08 227.44 226.93 232.69 224.44
CDF @ Maximum 338.90 344.02 335.70 341.02 336.49 344.02 337.01 344.18 333.31
Probability of Negative Net Cash Farm Income
Mean 41.25 23.33 41.98 33.85 41.50 30.39 40.21 30.63 44.29
Probability of Cash Flow Deficit
Mean 88.57 84.13 89.13 88.02 88.90 86.42 87.86 84.34 89.47
Probability of Losing Real Net Worth
Mean 75.89 65.66 77.46 73.53 76.84 70.80 75.39 66.57 79.47Appendix III  Table  7.  Summary of Alternative Farm Safety Net Options for TXCD825
A70 A90 B70 B90 C70 C80 C90 C95 NOINS
Safety Net and Indemnity Payments ($1,000)
Mean 0.11 12.86 0.09 9.47 0.03 0.25 2.73 10.23 0.00
Std Dev 5.48 66.21 4.92 57.51 2.49 9.25 30.38 58.95 0.00
Coef Var (%) 4931.02 514.85 5231.14 607.43 9999.67 3729.17 1111.44 576.19 0.00
Minimum 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Maximum 463.69 1331.95 435.19 1295.30 248.69 652.11 1055.52 1257.23 0.00
Mean/Theoritical Max (%) 0.02 0.97 0.02 0.73 0.01 0.04 0.26 0.81 0.00
P(Indemnity) (%) 0.06 6.80 0.06 4.79 0.01 0.14 1.49 6.07 0.00
CDF @  1%  (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
CDF @  5%  (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
CDF @ 10%  (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
CDF @ 15%  (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
CDF @ 20%  (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
CDF @ 25%  (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
CDF @ 30%  (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
CDF @ 35%  (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
CDF @ 40%  (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
CDF @ 45%  (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
CDF @ 50%  (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
CDF @ 55%  (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
CDF @ 60%  (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
CDF @ 65%  (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
CDF @ 70%  (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
CDF @ 75%  (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
CDF @ 80%  (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
CDF @ 85%  (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
CDF @ 90%  (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
CDF @ 95%  (%) 0.0 62.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 27.2 0.0
CDF @ 99%  (%) 0.0 358.1 0.0 309.3 0.0 0.0 76.4 316.7 0.0
Total Receipts ($1,000)
Mean 3813.89 3826.64 3813.87 3823.25 3813.80 3814.03 3816.51 3824.01 3813.78
Std Dev 323.33 304.90 323.38 308.90 323.59 322.98 317.99 307.11 323.68
Coef Var (%) 8.48 7.97 8.48 8.08 8.49 8.47 8.33 8.03 8.49
Minimum 2707.03 2930.19 2707.03 2768.55 2700.57 2707.03 2900.57 3116.68 2555.59
Maximum 5194.98 5194.98 5194.98 5194.98 5194.98 5194.98 5194.98 5194.98 5194.98
Net Cash Income ($1,000)
Mean 987.80 1000.83 987.78 997.40 987.73 988.12 991.04 998.65 987.69
Std Dev 350.84 337.45 350.89 340.80 351.06 350.65 347.00 338.93 351.10
Minimum -272.09 33.12 -272.09 -214.08 -272.09 -263.96 -79.03 226.27 -272.09
Maximum 2348.16 2348.16 2348.16 2348.16 2348.16 2348.16 2348.16 2348.16 2348.16
CDF @ Minimum -272.09 33.12 -272.09 -214.08 -272.09 -263.96 -79.03 226.27 -272.09
CDF @  1%  (%) 295.56 379.53 295.56 375.21 293.92 295.56 337.96 387.85 293.92
CDF @  5%  (%) 478.48 525.08 478.48 510.09 478.48 479.21 486.62 508.64 478.48
CDF @ 10%  (%) 571.85 599.62 571.85 587.53 571.85 572.38 577.84 597.18 571.85
CDF @ 15%  (%) 626.46 650.87 626.46 641.91 626.46 626.55 633.41 651.25 626.46
CDF @ 20%  (%) 672.89 694.28 672.89 687.18 672.89 673.24 680.60 691.33 672.89
CDF @ 25%  (%) 720.62 744.67 720.62 739.38 720.62 720.64 727.68 736.05 720.62
CDF @ 30%  (%) 768.19 788.90 768.19 780.98 768.19 768.20 770.30 781.52 768.19
CDF @ 35%  (%) 814.40 827.92 814.40 824.51 814.40 814.57 816.02 825.72 814.40
CDF @ 40%  (%) 860.77 873.31 860.77 872.59 860.77 861.03 862.06 872.71 860.77
CDF @ 45%  (%) 905.74 919.08 905.74 918.40 905.74 906.09 906.44 915.10 905.74
CDF @ 50%  (%) 959.69 969.35 959.69 965.03 959.69 959.69 960.30 964.29 959.69
CDF @ 55%  (%) 1011.74 1015.57 1011.74 1014.03 1011.74 1012.06 1012.23 1014.03 1011.74
CDF @ 60%  (%) 1064.70 1067.41 1064.70 1065.18 1064.70 1064.70 1065.06 1065.18 1064.70
CDF @ 65%  (%) 1115.69 1116.69 1115.69 1115.92 1115.69 1115.69 1115.87 1116.69 1115.69
CDF @ 70%  (%) 1162.81 1162.82 1162.81 1162.82 1162.81 1162.81 1162.81 1162.82 1162.81
CDF @ 75%  (%) 1205.49 1205.77 1205.49 1205.70 1205.49 1205.70 1205.83 1205.86 1205.49
CDF @ 80%  (%) 1272.20 1272.49 1272.20 1272.49 1272.20 1272.20 1273.16 1273.85 1272.20
CDF @ 85%  (%) 1369.32 1369.86 1369.32 1369.86 1369.32 1369.32 1369.86 1369.86 1369.32
CDF @ 90%  (%) 1487.28 1487.28 1487.28 1487.28 1487.28 1487.28 1487.28 1487.28 1487.28
CDF @ 95%  (%) 1623.49 1625.43 1623.49 1625.43 1623.49 1625.08 1625.43 1625.43 1623.49
CDF @ 99%  (%) 1834.52 1834.52 1834.52 1834.52 1834.52 1834.52 1834.52 1834.52 1834.52
CDF @ Maximum 2348.16 2348.16 2348.16 2348.16 2348.16 2348.16 2348.16 2348.16 2348.16
Probability of Negative Net Cash Farm Income
Mean 0.08 0.00 0.08 0.03 0.10 0.07 0.03 0.00 0.10
Probability of Cash Flow Deficit
Mean 1.83 1.16 1.83 1.28 1.85 1.81 1.50 1.11 1.84
Probability of Losing Real Net Worth
Mean 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00Appendix III  Table  8.  Summary of Alternative Farm Safety Net Options for INH1200
A70 A90 B70 B90 C70 C80 C90 C95 NOINS
Safety Net and Indemnity Payments ($1,000)
Mean 3.82 94.49 3.89 79.29 3.61 18.71 70.50 124.68 0.00
Std Dev 36.60 191.84 35.81 172.16 36.97 89.57 184.23 246.39 0.00
Coef Var (%) 957.14 203.02 921.70 217.14 1023.80 478.77 261.32 197.62 0.00
Minimum 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Maximum 899.39 1682.58 857.99 1600.70 994.37 1395.31 1817.79 2029.02 0.00
Mean/Theoritical Max (%) 0.43 5.62 0.45 4.95 0.36 1.34 3.88 6.15 0.00
P(Indemnity) (%) 2.13 31.63 2.20 31.37 1.78 8.03 22.38 35.17 0.00
CDF @  1%  (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
CDF @  5%  (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
CDF @ 10%  (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
CDF @ 15%  (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
CDF @ 20%  (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
CDF @ 25%  (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
CDF @ 30%  (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
CDF @ 35%  (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
CDF @ 40%  (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
CDF @ 45%  (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
CDF @ 50%  (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
CDF @ 55%  (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
CDF @ 60%  (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
CDF @ 65%  (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.2 0.0
CDF @ 70%  (%) 0.0 21.9 0.0 14.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 72.5 0.0
CDF @ 75%  (%) 0.0 92.4 0.0 65.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 144.5 0.0
CDF @ 80%  (%) 0.0 170.0 0.0 126.3 0.0 0.0 39.4 225.5 0.0
CDF @ 85%  (%) 0.0 272.3 0.0 199.5 0.0 0.0 143.5 330.0 0.0
CDF @ 90%  (%) 0.0 381.3 0.0 303.1 0.0 0.0 289.8 477.9 0.0
CDF @ 95%  (%) 0.0 519.5 0.0 465.4 0.0 114.1 478.2 672.8 0.0
CDF @ 99%  (%) 136.5 832.1 145.4 777.0 139.2 505.5 916.0 1120.0 0.0
Total Receipts ($1,000)
Mean 3021.78 3112.45 3021.84 3097.24 3021.57 3036.66 3088.45 3142.63 3017.96
Std Dev 405.10 330.01 405.23 340.89 405.94 388.23 354.61 340.51 412.10
Coef Var (%) 13.41 10.60 13.41 11.01 13.44 12.79 11.48 10.84 13.66
Minimum 1814.99 2187.64 1814.99 2098.11 1741.29 1901.70 2252.66 2332.63 1615.04
Maximum 4570.35 4570.35 4570.35 4570.35 4570.35 4570.35 4570.35 4570.35 4570.35
Net Cash Income ($1,000)
Mean 302.10 399.91 302.15 383.14 311.33 327.72 384.15 443.62 298.11
Std Dev 357.06 310.62 357.40 319.97 357.73 347.12 332.99 336.40 361.76
Minimum -818.66 -514.44 -818.66 -529.11 -803.29 -676.79 -522.26 -495.91 -872.21
Maximum 1448.59 1474.54 1448.59 1489.35 1460.43 1460.43 1628.53 1836.82 1448.59
CDF @ Minimum -818.66 -514.44 -818.66 -529.11 -803.29 -676.79 -522.26 -495.91 -872.21
CDF @  1%  (%) -436.82 -215.63 -445.93 -250.91 -444.73 -372.63 -266.06 -192.46 -475.69
CDF @  5%  (%) -258.95 -82.67 -262.22 -104.65 -250.89 -207.25 -129.57 -63.34 -274.29
CDF @ 10%  (%) -139.14 31.62 -139.77 3.19 -129.11 -103.72 -24.41 26.33 -149.81
CDF @ 15%  (%) -57.54 95.59 -58.00 68.86 -48.84 -27.04 46.32 91.11 -67.51
CDF @ 20%  (%) 3.36 144.69 2.98 114.46 11.52 33.60 98.49 153.47 -5.11
CDF @ 25%  (%) 50.59 184.69 50.82 155.92 59.79 80.28 147.58 205.15 45.59
CDF @ 30%  (%) 98.85 217.44 99.85 196.84 108.31 127.82 195.65 249.34 94.31
CDF @ 35%  (%) 145.74 250.63 148.06 231.66 156.55 173.68 234.35 291.08 142.03
CDF @ 40%  (%) 192.63 287.18 193.46 269.54 203.18 214.53 272.30 331.93 190.33
CDF @ 45%  (%) 231.06 325.47 232.30 307.87 242.31 253.41 312.67 370.56 229.04
CDF @ 50%  (%) 276.35 363.05 277.03 342.48 287.71 298.78 351.69 414.82 275.53
CDF @ 55%  (%) 319.36 408.55 319.78 382.10 329.73 341.77 393.89 457.31 318.41
CDF @ 60%  (%) 364.98 448.72 365.02 429.54 374.34 388.11 438.56 499.03 363.56
CDF @ 65%  (%) 415.80 490.87 415.80 477.87 423.88 441.67 483.24 552.11 415.15
CDF @ 70%  (%) 474.17 540.36 473.53 534.59 483.38 497.57 536.09 602.79 473.23
CDF @ 75%  (%) 538.80 596.65 538.80 588.55 547.51 559.06 595.20 659.75 538.80
CDF @ 80%  (%) 608.66 672.83 608.66 660.80 616.68 629.33 669.06 720.40 608.66
CDF @ 85%  (%) 694.37 741.76 694.37 739.57 702.55 706.23 749.27 789.99 694.37
CDF @ 90%  (%) 787.21 832.29 787.21 836.10 796.13 798.45 847.59 890.47 787.21
CDF @ 95%  (%) 939.02 968.39 939.02 962.15 946.76 950.06 980.37 1058.91 939.02
CDF @ 99%  (%) 1164.22 1180.93 1164.22 1183.54 1178.16 1178.68 1222.64 1318.40 1164.22
CDF @ Maximum 1448.59 1474.54 1448.59 1489.35 1460.43 1460.43 1628.53 1836.82 1448.59
Probability of Negative Net Cash Farm Income
Mean 19.60 8.32 19.67 9.77 19.03 17.20 11.49 8.48 20.38
Probability of Cash Flow Deficit
Mean 65.73 53.81 65.64 56.67 62.08 60.74 54.32 46.87 65.85
Probability of Losing Real Net Worth
Mean 15.16 10.22 15.14 10.90 14.57 13.19 10.14 8.08 15.32